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PREFACE 
In educational contexts as well as in basic cognitive research, tests are regarded mainly 
as a tool to assess the success of previous learning. However, this view does not adequately 
reflect the role tests play in knowledge acquisition, as the event of testing itself contributes 
significantly to the formation of durable memory representations. Numerous studies show that 
retrieving previously studied information from memory benefits later memory more than re-
exposure to that information (Roediger & Butler, 2011; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). To date, 
a large body of research has been devoted to the investigation of influencing factors and bound-
ary conditions of this so-called “testing effect” (Carrier & Pashler, 1992). Based on this re-
search, extensive claims have been made regarding educational applications (e.g., Nunes & 
Karpicke, 2015). Yet, little research has examined whether emotional factors may affect the 
testing effect, although emotions are ubiquitous in real-life educational settings (Pekrun, Goetz, 
Titz, & Perry, 2002), and impact all stages of memory processing (for a review, see Fiedler & 
Hütter, 2014; Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Kensinger, 2009). In this context, both the emotional 
significance of memories itself, and the emotions that learners experience during studying and 
testing, may play a role. In addition, one special type of emotionally significant memory repre-
sentations is memory of personally experienced events (i.e., autobiographical memories). To 
date, it is unknown whether the testing effect persists in autobiographical memory. 
This cumulative thesis presents three studies that address the above-mentioned poten-
tially moderating variables of the testing effect. These studies have been published in peer-
reviewed journals over the last three years. A short overview of the studies is given on page 6, 
and the contributions of the co-authors are shown on page 7. In the first part of the thesis, the 
theoretical and empirical background underlying the three studies is presented. For this purpose, 
an overview of research on the testing effect and on the influence of emotions on cognitive 
processing is provided. In the second and main part of the thesis, the three studies are repro-
duced in their accepted pre-print versions with the following changes. First, the references for 
all three studies are combined into one bibliography at the end of the thesis. Second, section 
headings are standardized, and the numbering of the figures and tables is adjusted to allow 
consecutive numbering throughout the thesis. Third, Study 2’s supplementary material (origi-
nally provided online) is included at the end of the article. The third and last part of the thesis 
provides a comprehensive discussion of the three studies’ results and outlines how they con-
tribute to the existing testing-effect literature and may spark new research.  
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ABSTRACT 
The finding that testing previously presented information promotes later memory more 
than presenting the information again (i.e., the testing effect) is a well-documented phenome-
non, and numerous studies have identified influencing factors and boundary conditions. The 
present cumulative thesis aimed to clarify the role of factors that have received only marginal 
attention in previous testing-effect research: the potential influences of emotions. STUDY 1 
examined whether the effects of testing differ for emotionally significant memories compared 
to neutral memories. For this purpose, a standard cued recall testing-effect paradigm was em-
ployed. Participants first studied emotionally negative or neutral cue-target pairs, and then re-
peatedly retrieved or restudied the pairs. In a 1-week delayed memory test, both an emotional 
enhancement effect and the typical pattern of the testing effect, with higher memory perfor-
mance for previously tested than for previously restudied memories, were observed. However, 
emotionally negative and neutral memories did not differ in the effects of testing and restudy-
ing. STUDY 2 investigated whether the testing effect extends to emotional and unemotional 
autobiographical memories. Participants initially described memories of personally experi-
enced events in response to emotionally negative, emotionally positive, and neutral cue words, 
and were subsequently tested on their previously described memories or restudied them. In two 
delayed memory tests at a 2-week and 13-week retention interval, regardless of the emotional 
significance of the memories, no advantage of testing compared to restudying autobiographical 
memories emerged. In STUDY 3, across two experiments, the effect of the affective state ex-
perienced during studying and testing was investigated. An established testing-effect paradigm 
using educationally relevant text material was employed, and affective states were manipulated 
before participants initially studied the texts (Experiment 1) or before they were tested on the 
texts or restudied them (Experiment 2). In both experiments, in a 1-week delayed memory test, 
the typical pattern of the testing effect emerged, with superior performance for previously tested 
compared to previously restudied contents. However, in none of the experiments did affect in-
fluence the occurrence or magnitude of the testing effect. In summary, Study 1 and Study 3 
indicate that the testing effect may be relatively robust against emotional influences. This find-
ing is of special relevance regarding potential educational applications. Study 2, on the other 
hand, shows a potential boundary condition: The advantage of testing compared to repeated re-
exposure may not persist in autobiographical memory. The present cumulative thesis concludes 
with a comprehensive discussion of the three studies’ results, which outlines their contributions to 
existing literature, and their implications for future testing-effect research.
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9 INTRODUCTION 
The Testing Effect 
The act of retrieving information from memory in a test can provide a powerful means 
to enhance later memory for that information. While these beneficial consequences of testing 
previously learned information have already been demonstrated in empirical studies dating back 
about 100 years (Abott, 1909; Gates, 1917; Jones, 1923-1924; Spitzer, 1939), and were sporad-
ically revisited by cognitive researchers from the 1960s to the 1990s (e.g., Allen, Mahler, & 
Estes, 1969; Bartlett & Tulving, 1974; Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Darley & Murdock, 1971; 
Glover, 1989; Hogan & Kintsch, 1971; Landauer & Eldridge, 1967; Madigan & McCabe, 1971; 
Tulving, 1967), increased interest in the testing effect (Carrier & Pashler, 1992) emerged in the 
2000s (Roediger & Karpicke, 2018), resulting in a boost of further research.  
The term “testing effect” refers to the finding that retrieving previously studied infor-
mation from memory in a test (also termed “retrieval practice”) benefits long-term retention 
beyond the effect of control activities that imply the same amount of re-exposure to that infor-
mation (Roediger & Butler, 2011; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). Hence, the typical testing-
effect paradigm consists of three phases: an initial study phase, a subsequent restudy/ 
testing phase, where the previously presented material is either re-presented or tested, and a 
delayed memory test on the previously presented material. The testing effect has been replicated 
across various test formats, study materials, experimental designs, and sample characteristics 
(for meta-analyses, see Adesope, Trevisan, & Sundararajan, 2017; Rowland, 2014). Further-
more, variables modulating the testing effect have been examined in numerous studies, both in 
laboratory and applied classroom settings. The present chapter first provides an overview of 
contemporary theoretical accounts of the testing effect and then outlines the current state of 
research concerning influencing factors and boundary conditions of the testing effect.  
Theoretical Accounts 
To date, the mechanisms underlying the testing effect are not yet fully understood. Five 
theoretical accounts which have been prominently discussed in previous research are transfer-
appropriate processing, retrieval effort, distribution-based bifurcation, elaborative processing, 
and episodic context (for reviews, see Karpicke, Lehman, & Aue, 2014; Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006a; Rowland, 2014).  It should be noted that these accounts are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive (see Rowland, 2014). The first of the above-mentioned theoretical accounts, transfer-
appropriate processing, suggests that memory performance in a delayed test will be best if the 
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required cognitive processes are similar or identical to the cognitive processes at encoding 
(Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). The second theoretical ac-
count, retrieval effort, suggests that effortful processing yields more durable memory represen-
tations than easy processing (e.g., Bjork, 1994; Pyc & Rawson, 2009). The remaining three 
accounts, distribution-based bifurcation (e.g., Kornell, Bjork, & Garcia, 2011), elaborative pro-
cessing (e.g., Carpenter, 2009, 2011; Kornell, Klein, & Rawson, 2015; Pyc & Rawson, 2010), 
and episodic context (e.g., Karpicke, Lehman et al., 2014; Rowland, Littrell-Baez, Sensenig, & 
DeLosh, 2014) are the most widely discussed accounts in recent research, and thus will be 
outlined in more detail below.  
The distribution-based bifurcation model (Kornell et al., 2011; see also Halamish & 
Bjork, 2011), similar to the retrieval-effort account, originates from the assumption that suc-
cessful retrieval provides a boost in memory strength. In addition, the model assumes that tests 
can bifurcate distributions of memory strengths across items because successfully retrieved 
items receive a large boost whereas non-retrieved items receive no boost in memory strength. 
By contrast, when restudying, all items are presented again, thus all restudied items receive a 
boost in memory strength, but to a lesser degree than successfully retrieved items. The bifurca-
tion model can serve as a useful framework to describe typical patterns of results in testing-
effect research, such as the common finding of a test-delay interaction, with the testing effect 
appearing or increasing after increased retention intervals (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b; 
see Rowland, 2014, for a meta-analysis). According to the bifurcated distribution proposed by 
the model, at short retention intervals, restudying may seem more beneficial than testing be-
cause comparably more restudied than tested items received a boost in memory strength and 
thus lie above recall threshold. Over time, memory strength declines for all items, resulting in 
restudied items falling below the recall threshold, while formerly successfully retrieved items 
still possess enough memory strength to stay above the recall threshold even after a prolonged 
retention interval. In line with this assumption, the test-delay interaction seems to decrease or 
disappear if feedback is provided after initial retrieval or if all items are retrieved successfully, 
presumably because under these conditions, bifurcation occurs to a lesser degree (provision of 
feedback) or not at all (successful retrieval of all items) (Kornell et al., 2011). However, the 
bifurcation model does not aim to provide any explanations concerning specific underlying 
mechanisms (Kornell et al., 2011, p. 86); that is, the model presupposes that retrieval strength-
ens memories but does not specify why and how this strengthening of memories occurs (see 
Karpicke, Lehman, & Aue, 2014).  
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The next theoretical account, elaborative processing, attempts to specify why retrieving 
information in a test may strengthen memory more than restudying. This account posits that the 
act of retrieval initiates elaborative processing (Carpenter, 2009, 2011; Pyc & Rawson, 2010). 
Specifically, in search of the target information, related concepts are activated, which serves to 
update and strengthen the memory trace and creates multiple pathways by which the infor-
mation can be accessed at retrieval. By contrast, restudying involves complete re-exposure to 
the target information, which renders extensive elaborative processing less likely. The elabora-
tive processing account also aligns with the retrieval-effort account. More retrieval effort in-
volves more extensive memory search until the correct target information is encountered. This 
results in more widespread activations of related memory contents, which may later serve as 
additional retrieval routes, compared to easy retrievals where the target information is readily 
accessible.  
Another recent account of the testing effect that involves elaborative retrieval as the 
core component is the two-stage framework proposed by Kornell et al. (2015). According to 
this framework, both processing during the retrieval attempt (stage 1) and processing after the 
answer has become available (stage 2) are accountable for the benefit received from testing. 
Specifically, processing during the retrieval attempt involves the spreading of activations 
through the associative network of memory contents related to the presented cue or question. 
As soon as the correct answer is activated and successfully retrieved, the associations between 
the target information, related concepts, and the cue or question are updated and strengthened, 
which in turn facilitates subsequent retrieval attempts. By contrast, when restudying, the first 
stage of the process is omitted, and consequently less related concepts and associations are 
activated. According to this model, successful retrieval is not a prerequisite for the benefits of 
retrieval attempts or for subsequent answer processing to occur; unsuccessful retrieval attempts 
followed by correct answer feedback can yield similar memory benefits (Kornell, Hays, & 
Bjork, 2009; Kornell et al., 2015). The two-stage framework is also consistent with findings 
showing that factors influencing reconsolidation immediately after retrieval can modulate the 
magnitude of the testing effect (Finn & Roediger, 2011; Finn, Roediger, & Rosenzweig, 2012). 
These findings demonstrate that both processing during the retrieval attempt and after the an-
swer has become available are crucial for the testing effect. 
Besides semantic elaboration, the reactivation of contextual episodic information during 
testing may play an important role. The episodic context account (Karpicke, Lehman, & Aue, 
2014; Rowland et al., 2014) presumes that during retrieval, the episodic context that was present 
during initial study is reinstated, and upon successful retrieval, memory traces are updated with 
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additional features pertaining to the present episodic context. Those episodic contextual features 
can serve as additional retrieval cues in later tests, rendering previously retrieved memory traces 
more retrievable, compared to memory traces with non-updated context representations. This 
account also predicts that more effortful initial retrieval conditions should elicit more powerful 
testing effects. For example, greater lags between initial study and testing or between subse-
quent retrieval attempts, make context reinstatement more necessary (as the current context will 
have shifted more from the original learning context). Therefore, memory traces will benefit 
more from the enrichment with new, additional contextual features. Similarly, free recall tests 
may require reinstatement of prior contexts more than recognition tests. Finally, in cued recall 
tasks, context reinstatement may be more necessary if semantic associations between the cue 
and the target information are weak (see Carpenter, 2009). 
Influencing Factors and Boundary Conditions 
Numerous studies have sought to identify influencing factors and boundary conditions 
for the occurrence and magnitude of the testing effect. In the following section, previous find-
ings related to the employed test conditions, study materials, research designs and settings, and 
the characteristics of the learners are reviewed. 
Test Conditions 
The testing effect has been replicated for a variety of different types of tests, including 
free recall tests (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b; Smith, Floerke, & Thomas, 2016), short 
answer tests (e.g., Butler & Roediger, 2007; Nungester & Duchastel, 1982), cued recall tests 
(e.g., Carpenter, 2009, 2011; Karpicke, Blunt, & Smith, 2016), and recognition tests (e.g., 
McDaniel, Bugg, Liu, & Brick, 2015). Regarding influencing factors and boundary conditions 
related to the employed test materials and test conditions, three main factors have been iden-
tified as vital in many testing-effect studies. 
First, the success of the initial retrieval is a crucial factor underlying the testing effect 
(e.g., Karpicke, Blunt, Sumeracki, & Karpicke, 2014). For example, in a recent meta-analysis 
(Rowland, 2014), reliable testing effects only emerged in studies where the initial retrieval suc-
cess rate was at least 50% (unless feedback was provided, which will be discussed in more 
detail further below).  
Second, more robust and larger testing effects generally result from conditions that ren-
der the initial retrieval more difficult. For example, testing effects are generally larger for initial 
tests involving productive recalls, such as free recall and cued recall tests, than for initial tests 
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involving recognition (e.g., Butler & Roediger, 2007; Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Glover, 
1989; Greving & Richter, 2018; McDaniel, Anderson, Derbish, & Morrisette, 2007; for a meta-
analysis see Rowland, 2014). It is important to note that this seems to be the case regardless of 
the format of the final memory assessment (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Glover, 1989; Kang, 
McDermott, & Roediger, 2007; McDaniel et al., 2007; for a meta-analysis, see Rowland, 2014), 
which contradicts the transfer-appropriate processing account. More potent testing effects are 
generally also produced by other conditions that render initial retrieval more effortful, such as 
providing less cue support (e.g., Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006), using weakly associated rather 
than strongly associated cue-target pairs (Carpenter, 2009), or extending the lag between initial 
studying and initial testing (e.g., Karpicke & Roediger, 2007a, 2007b; Pyc & Rawson, 2009). 
Similarly, additional benefits relative to a single test have mostly been found when several tests 
were administered spaced apart, but not always when several tests were administered in a 
massed schedule (e.g., Glover, 1989; Karpicke & Bauernschmidt, 2011; Karpicke & Roediger, 
2007a; Karpicke & Roediger, 2010; Lyle, Bego, Hopkins, Hieb, & Ralston, 2019; Roediger 
& Karpicke, 2006b). These findings demonstrating more potent testing effects following more 
difficult initial retrieval conditions support the theoretical accounts that emphasize the promi-
nent role of effortful processing during initial retrieval, due to either more extensive elaborative 
processing or more extensive shifts in episodic contexts. In summary, the testing effect seems 
to require the initial retrieval to be difficult enough to exert effortful processing, but, on the 
other hand, not too difficult to jeopardize sufficiently high initial retrieval success. 
Third, the length of the retention interval between the initial acquisition (i.e., study and 
restudy/testing phase) and the final memory assessment seems to be another important bound-
ary condition for the testing effect. Usually, reliable testing effects have been found after reten-
tion intervals of several days up to a week (for a meta-analysis, see Rowland, 2014) or even 
longer (e.g., 1 month, Butler & Roediger, 2007; 9 months, Carpenter, Pashler, & Cepeda, 
2009). However, the picture is less clear concerning short retention intervals. Typically, a test-
delay interaction can be observed with no testing effect or even a restudy benefit emerging at 
short retention intervals of several minutes, and the pattern reversing when retention intervals 
extend to several days (e.g., Congleton & Rajaram, 2012; Mulligan & Peterson, 2015; Roediger 
& Karpicke, 2006b; Toppino & Cohen, 2009; Wheeler, Ewers, & Buonanno, 2003). Yet, there 
are also several studies in which potent testing effects have been demonstrated already after 
short retention intervals (e.g., Carpenter, 2009; Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Karpicke & 
Zaromb, 2010; Rowland & DeLosh, 2015). According to the distribution-based bifurcation 
model (Kornell et al., 2011) and two-stage model (Kornell et al., 2015), moderating factors may 
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be exceedingly high initial retrieval rates or the provision of feedback after unsuccessful re-
trieval attempts (e.g., Kornell et al., 2011, 2015; Rowland & DeLosh, 2015). These factors may 
lead to an equal amount of item exposure for both restudy and testing conditions. 
Beyond the three main boundary conditions described so far, providing test feedback 
and testing transfer of knowledge are further factors that can influence the testing effect. Con-
cerning the role of feedback, in a recent meta-analysis (Rowland, 2014), regardless of the initial 
retrieval success, the largest testing effects were observed for studies in which test feedback 
was provided, either by presenting correct test answers or by re-presenting study material at 
least once after initial testing. Indeed, other studies demonstrate that the presentation of the 
correct answer after an unsuccessful retrieval attempt can yield a testing effect (Hays, Kornell, 
& Bjork, 2013; Kornell et al., 2009) and even lead to equal benefits in delayed memory perfor-
mance as a successful retrieval (Kornell et al., 2015). When comparing the benefit received 
from testing with and without feedback, most studies reveal an advantage of testing with feed-
back (e.g., Agarwal, Karpicke, Kang, Roediger, & McDermott, 2008; Butler, Karpicke, & 
Roediger, 2007; Butler & Roediger, 2008; Kang et al., 2007; Karpicke & Roediger, 2007b; 
2010; McDaniel & Fisher, 1991; Zaromb & Roediger, 2010). However, it is important to note 
that when providing feedback or additional study opportunities following testing, additional 
factors beyond the direct effects of testing itself come into play. For example, it has been shown 
that tests can render subsequent learning more effective (test-potentiated learning; Arnold & 
McDermott, 2013; Wissman & Rawson, 2018), even when new information is presented that is 
unrelated to the test contents (forward effect of testing; Pastötter & Bäuml, 2014, 2019; for 
reviews, see Chan, Meissner, & Davis, 2018; Yang, Potts, & Shanks, 2018). Thus, it is not clear 
whether observed benefits of tests followed by feedback stem from direct effects of testing 
itself, indirect effects of testing on subsequent learning, or the interplay of both mechanisms. 
Indeed, for this reason, providing feedback in testing-effect studies has been criticized because 
it is difficult to draw conclusions about the mnemonic benefits of retrieval (Karpicke, Lehman, 
& Aue, 2014). 
An important issue regarding potential educational implications of the testing effect is 
to what extent testing boosts the transfer and application of previously acquired contents across 
different types of knowledge assessments. However, findings concerning the transfer of learn-
ing from tests are mixed (for a review, see Pan & Rickard, 2018). There is some evidence that 
testing compared to restudying improves knowledge transfer within the same or a different 
knowledge domain (e.g., Butler, 2010; Butler, Black-Maier, Raley, & Marsh, 2017; Cho & 
Powers, 2019; Dirkx, Kester, & Kirschner, 2014; Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Coane, 2010; Jensen, 
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McDaniel, Woodard, & Kummer, 2014; Kang, McDaniel, & Pashler, 2011; Rohrer, Taylor, & 
Sholar, 2010). However, other studies failed to observe testing effects in knowledge transfer 
assessments (e.g., Hinze & Wiley, 2011; Pan, Gopal, & Rickard, 2016; Pan & Rickard, 2017; 
Wooldridge, Bugg, McDaniel, & Liu, 2014), such as deductive inferences (Tran, Rohrer, & 
Pashler, 2015), transfer to a new perspective in spatial memory (Brunyé et al., 2019), or when 
the initial type of test questions (factual vs. higher-order) mismatched the type of test questions 
in the final test (Agarwal, 2019).  
Study Materials 
The testing effect has been replicated using a wide range of study materials, including 
word lists (e.g., Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Karpicke et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2016; Zaromb 
& Roediger, 2010), paired associates (e.g., Carpenter, 2009, 2011; Carpenter, Pashler, & Vul, 
2006; Carrier & Pashler, 1992), pictorial information (e.g., Kang, 2010; Lipowski, Pyc, 
Dunlosky, & Rawson, 2014; Smith et al., 2016), and more educationally relevant materials such 
as vocabulary pairs (e.g., Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Kuhbandner, Aslan, Emmerdinger, & 
Murayama, 2016; Pyc & Rawson, 2009, 2012; Tse & Pu, 2012), text materials (e.g., Agarwal 
et al., 2008; Butler, 2010; Dobson & Linderholm, 2015; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011; Roediger 
& Karpicke, 2006b; Weinstein, McDermott, & Roediger, 2010), mathematical functions (Kang 
et al., 2011), skills learning materials (Kromann, Jensen, & Ringsted, 2009), spatial learning 
materials (Brunyé et al., 2019; Carpenter & Kelly, 2012; Carpenter & Pashler, 2007; Rohrer et 
al., 2010), and videotaped or online lectures (Butler & Roediger, 2007; Heitmann, Grund, 
Berthold, Fries, & Roelle, 2018).  
Evidence is less clear concerning learning from complex reading materials. Although 
the testing effect usually remains robust for text materials such as prose passages (e.g., Agarwal 
et al., 2008; Dobson & Linderholm, 2015; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011; Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006b; Weinstein et al., 2010), recent studies failed to replicate the testing effect for highly 
interrelated reading materials (in contrast to learning materials in which each fact can theoreti-
cally be learned separately) (for a review, see Van Gog & Sweller, 2015; but see Karpicke & 
Aue, 2015; Rawson, 2015, for contrary positions). For instance, De Jonge, Tabbers, and Rikers 
(2015), in a 1-week delayed memory test, found no benefit for testing compared to restudying 
a complex science text. However, when the same text was dissected into a list of facts, which 
reduced the text complexity by disrupting the text coherence, the typical testing effect did 
emerge. Furthermore, several studies showed that repeatedly restudying worked examples of 
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problem solutions may be equally or even more beneficial for later problem solving than vari-
ous kinds of retrieval practices after studying worked examples (Leahy, Hanham, & Sweller, 
2015; Van Gog & Kester, 2012; Van Gog et al., 2015; Yeo & Fazio, 2019).  
Research Designs and Settings 
The testing effect seems to remain robust across different experimental designs, such as 
manipulating testing and restudy conditions within subjects (e.g., Butler, 2010; Roediger 
& Karpicke, 2006b) or between subjects (e.g., Hinze & Rapp, 2014; Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010; 
Pyc & Rawson, 2010), or presenting restudy and test trials consecutively in blocked lists (e.g., 
Carpenter et al., 2006; Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010) or intermingled in mixed lists (e.g., 
Carpenter, Pashler, Wixted, & Vul, 2008; Karpicke & Zaromb, 2010, for a direct comparison, 
see Abel & Roediger, 2017; Rowland et al., 2014).  
Regarding potential educational implications of the testing effect, an important question 
is whether the effect, as established in laboratory settings, remains stable when examined in 
field studies. Indeed, the effects of testing have been replicated in several classroom studies, 
mostly by applying short (multiple-choice or short-answer) quizzes on parts of the class mate-
rial (e.g., Agarwal, 2019; Bjork, Little, & Storm, 2014; Carpenter et al., 2009; Cranney, Ahn, 
McKinnon, Morris, & Watts, 2009; Hopkins, Lyle, Hieb, & Ralston, 2016; Jensen et al., 2014; 
McDaniel et al., 2007; McDaniel, Thomas, Agarwal, McDermott, & Roediger, 2013; 
McDermott, Agarwal, D'Antonio, Roediger, & McDaniel, 2014; Roediger, Agarwal, 
McDaniel, & McDermott, 2011; Trumbo, Leiting, McDaniel, & Hodge, 2016). However, re-
garding the actual importance of these findings for educational settings, two points should be 
kept in mind. First, the testing effects in these classroom studies might be an artificial effect 
due to the somewhat weak control conditions (e.g., doing nothing or simply reading the quizzed 
statements, which has been shown to be an inefficient study strategy; Callender & McDaniel, 
2009; see also Kornell, Rabelo, & Klein, 2012). Second, the final criterion tests often consisted 
of similar or identical test questions and/or test formats so that other factors beyond retrieval 
benefits may have played a role (e.g., test practice; McCabe, Langer, Borod, & Bender, 2011). 
Generally speaking, when considering testing effects outside of laboratory contexts, observed 
benefits may actually reflect the effects of a number of other factors beyond the direct effects 
of testing, such as increased motivation for continuous, spaced study of contents, increased 
metacognitive awareness of current knowledge gaps, test expectancy, and increased test expe-
rience (e.g., Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, & Kulik, 1991; Finley & Benjamin, 2012; McCabe et al., 
2011; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a; Thomas & McDaniel, 2007). 
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Characteristics of the Learners 
Although most testing-effect studies have been conducted with undergraduate students, 
there is some evidence that the testing benefits can generalize across age and education levels. 
Testing effects have been demonstrated with elementary or preschool children (e.g., 
Bouwmeester & Verkoeijen, 2011; Fritz, Morris, Acton, Voelkel, & Etkind, 2007; Goossens, 
Camp, Verkoeijen, & Tabbers, 2014; Jones et al., 2016; Karpicke, 2016; Lipowski et al., 2014; 
Rohrer et al., 2010; for a review, see Fazio & Marsh, 2019), middle school students (e.g., 
McDermott et al., 2014; Roediger et al., 2011), high school students (e.g., Morris, Fritz, 
Jackson, Nichol, & Roberts, 2005), young adults who do not attend university (Meyer & Logan, 
2013), and middle-aged to older adults (e.g., Bishara & Jacoby, 2008; Coane, 2013; Meyer 
& Logan, 2013; Tse, Balota, & Roediger, 2010). 
Additionally, several studies have examined whether the magnitude of the testing effect 
is influenced by individual differences in cognitive abilities. Some studies show that the testing 
effect persists across different levels of reading comprehension, processing speed, and visual 
word decoding skills in children (Karpicke et al., 2016; Moreira, Pinto, Justi, & Jaeger, 2019), 
and for populations with memory dysfunctions (Sumowski et al., 2010). Other studies indicate 
that the testing effect remains robust (Bertilsson, Wiklund-Hörnqvist, Stenlund, & Jonsson, 
2017; Minear, Coane, Boland, Cooney, & Albat, 2018; Wiklund-Hörnqvist, Jonsson, & 
Nyberg, 2014), or may even be more pronounced, for individuals with low working memory 
capacity (Agarwal, Finley, Rose, & Roediger, 2017; but see Tse & Pu, 2012 for a finding that 
testing effect and trait test anxiety may be negatively correlated in individuals with low working 
memory capacity) or low episodic memory skills (Brewer & Unsworth, 2012; Pan, Pashler, 
Potter, & Rickard, 2015; Robey, 2019). In addition, the testing effect may be larger for individ-
uals who possess less effective learning strategies (Minear et al., 2018; Robey, 2019) and less 
prior topic knowledge (Cogliano, Kardash, & Bernacki, 2019). In summary, previous research 
indicates that individuals with lower memory abilities and ineffective learning strategies may 
benefit equally or even more from testing than others (but see Carpenter et al., 2016 for the 
contradictory finding of a larger testing effect in high-achieving students).  
Beyond trait-like individual differences, another important issue is whether transitory 
psychological states, such as the learner’s motivational or affective states, may influence the 
occurrence and magnitude of the testing effect. However, this issue has received only marginal 
attention in previous research. To date, only two studies have directly manipulated participants’ 
motivational state during retrieval practice (Kang & Pashler, 2014; Kuhbandner et al., 2016). 
These studies, while still replicating the testing effect, did find motivational influences on the 
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overall benefits received from testing. For example, Kuhbandner et al. (2016) demonstrated that 
inducing extrinsic motivation by providing monetary reward contingent on the initial retrieval 
success decreased correct recall, increased commission errors for previously tested contents, 
and even reduced correct recall for initially successfully retrieved memories, compared to a no-
reward condition. Thus, extrinsic motivation may reduce the benefit received from successful 
retrieval.  
A few studies examined the testing effect in contexts of performance pressure and acute 
stress. Hinze and Rapp (2014) induced performance-related affect during retrieval practice by 
using a peer-pressure method. In the pressure condition, researchers informed participants that 
they could earn themselves and a partner a monetary bonus if they scored higher than the uni-
versity average on the retrieval task, and that their partner had already achieved the required 
score. In a delayed test, a testing effect emerged when comparing a no-pressure condition to a 
reread condition. However, the testing effect was absent, and for some question types even 
reversed, when comparing the pressure condition to the reread condition. Some classroom 
studies found that ungraded quizzes may reduce test anxiety with respect to the final assessment 
(Agarwal, D'Antonio, Roediger, McDermott, & McDaniel, 2014) and that ungraded quizzes 
yield better final exam performance compared to taking no quizzes (Khanna, 2015; Khanna & 
Cortese, 2016). In contrast, students reported more anxiety regarding a course when graded 
quizzes were employed, and the graded quizzes did not lead to improved final exam perfor-
mance (Khanna, 2015; Khanna & Cortese, 2016). Finally, when acute stress was induced before 
the final memory assessment, the testing effect remained intact (Szőllősi et al., 2017). Some 
studies suggest that previous retrieval practice may even protect memory against stress-induced 
detrimental effects (Smith et al., 2016; Smith, Davis, & Thomas, 2018; Smith, Race, Davis, & 
Thomas, 2019). 
Emotions and Memory 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, numerous studies have been conducted to identify 
moderating variables and boundary conditions of the testing effect. However, one important 
factor that has received only marginal attention in testing-effect research is the potential influ-
ence of emotions. This is especially surprising given the fact that extensive implications for 
educational settings have been drawn on the basis of testing-effect research (e.g., Karpicke, 
2016; Nunes & Karpicke, 2015). In real-life educational settings, emotions are ubiquitous 
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(Pekrun et al., 2002). At the same time, a wealth of research has demonstrated impacts of emo-
tions on all levels of information processing (for reviews, see e.g., Fiedler & Hütter, 2014; 
Kensinger, 2009; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). Thus, it is essential to investigate whether emotions 
may influence the effects of testing.  
From a functional perspective, two general levels of emotional influences on memory 
can be distinguished (Kuhbandner & Pekrun, 2010, p. 37). First, numerous studies indicate that 
emotionally significant stimuli may be processed and stored qualitatively different than neutral 
stimuli (for reviews, see Kensinger, 2009; Levine & Edelstein, 2009). In this context, one spe-
cial category of emotionally significant memory representations is memory of personally ex-
perienced events (i.e., autobiographical memories). Autobiographical memory representations, 
beyond being often emotionally significant, also exhibit other distinct characteristics (Conway, 
2005) that may influence the way they are processed. Second, previous research shows that an 
individual’s currently experienced affective state may influence cognitive processing, regard-
less of whether emotionally significant or neutral information is processed (for a review, see 
Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Fiedler & Hütter, 2014). This chapter presents a brief review of 
research on the processing of emotional memories, memories for personally experienced 
events, and the effects of affective states on memory.  
Emotions – a Short Conceptual Clarification 
Although exact definitions of the term “emotion” diverge among different theoretical 
perspectives, there are a number of widely agreed-upon constitutional criteria of an emotion or 
emotional episode (Moors & Scherer, 2013). First, emotions are generally considered as tem-
porarily restricted episodes that, albeit they may vary in duration, are usually short-lived. In 
contrast, more enduring, mildly intense affective states are often labelled as “moods” (Scherer, 
2005). Second, emotional episodes are marked by changes in multiple organismic subsystems, 
including cognitive, motivational, physiological, and behavioral changes, as well as changes in 
subjective experience (often conceptualized as result of the perception of changes in the other 
subsystems, Moors, 2013). Different emotion theories diverge on how many of these compo-
nents are necessary to speak of an emotion, whether certain components are causes, conse-
quences, or constituents of an emotion, and the degree of synchronization along the changes in 
different subsystems. However, it is generally agreed upon that each of these changes and their 
interplay serve an adaptive function, namely, to evaluate and signal the relevance of stimuli for 
major goals of the organism, and prepare adaptive reactions (Moors, 2017; Moors & Scherer, 
2013).  
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A major distinction between different theoretical perspectives concerns the basic under-
lying structure of emotions. In this context, two broad classes of theories can be distinguished: 
categorical and dimensional theories (Gray & Watson, 2007; Moors, 2017). Categorical 
theories postulate the existence of discrete, mutually exclusive basic emotional categories or 
affect programs (e.g., Ekman, 1992, 1999; Izard, 1993, 2009). Dimensional theories, on the 
other hand, describe affective states as values in a multidimensional space. Concerning the 
number of underlying dimensions, two-dimensional models have proven the best empirical fit 
(e.g., Russell & Barrett, 1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). These dimensions 
are mostly interpreted as valence, with values varying between displeasure and pleasure, and 
arousal, with values varying between activation and sleep (e.g., Barrett & Russell, 1999; 
Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 1999). More recent models strive for an integration of dimen-
sional and categorical emotional theories. They assume that affect is a composite of current 
values on the dimensions of valence and arousal, and that the categorization of affective expe-
rience into acquired mental concepts forms the experience of discrete emotional episodes (such 
as anger or sadness) (Barrett, 2006a, 2006b; Russell, 2003, 2009).  
Memory for Emotionally Significant Information 
Emotional significance is one of the main factors influencing our memory about past 
events. A large body of research shows that emotionally significant information is better re-
membered than neutral information, which is referred to as emotional memory enhancement 
(for reviews see Kensinger, 2004; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). However, the emotional enhance-
ment effect does not necessarily occur across all elements of an emotional scene; typically, a 
memory trade-off at the expense of contextual information can be observed (for a review, see 
Kensinger, 2009). 
Memory enhancement for emotionally significant stimuli has been demonstrated using 
a wide range of stimuli such as words, pictures, or narrated slide shows (for reviews, see 
Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002; Kensinger, 2004; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). The advantage of 
emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli can be found across all stages of information 
processing, from the earliest pre-attentive stages such as iconic memory (Kuhbandner, Spitzer, 
& Pekrun, 2011) to attentional selection and prioritized encoding, to later stages such as 
memory consolidation and retrieval. For instance, ample evidence indicates that emotionally 
significant stimuli attract attention more readily than neutral stimuli and receive prioritized pro-
cessing (for reviews, see Vuilleumier, 2005; Yiend, 2010). Emotionally significant stimuli are 
encountered more rapidly in visual search tasks (e.g., Lundqvist, Bruce, & Öhman, 2015; 
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Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001), are fixated on first and gazed at longer compared to neutral 
stimuli (e.g., Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & Calvo, 2006), and are more likely 
to be processed under conditions of limited attentional resources than neutral stimuli (e.g., 
Anderson, 2005; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Talmi & McGarry, 2012).  
Regarding subsequent stages of information processing, emotional significance seems 
to modulate memory consolidation such that emotionally significant memories are more likely 
to be consolidated into durable memory traces, leading, in turn, to an increased likelihood of 
memory retrieval. This is supported by findings of a more pronounced emotional enhancement 
effect after longer retention intervals (e.g., LaBar & Phelps, 1998; for reviews, see Kensinger, 
2004; McGaugh, 2004; Tyng, Amin, Saad, & Malik, 2017). Furthermore, studies on sleep-
mediated memory consolidation show that sleep provides a larger benefit to memories for emo-
tionally significant stimuli than for non-emotional stimuli (e.g., Payne, Stickgold, Swanberg, & 
Kensinger, 2008; Wagner, Hallschmid, Rasch, & Born, 2006). However, the evidence regard-
ing the influence of emotional significance on other factors that modulate memories after initial 
encoding is less conclusive. For example, forgetting as a consequence of intentionally attempt-
ing to forget previously encoded information (e.g., Barnier et al., 2007; Taylor, Quinlan, & 
Vullings, 2018; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006, but see Payne & Corrigan, 2007, for a contra-
dictory finding), forgetting in the think/no-think paradigm as a consequence of repeatedly sup-
pressive thinking of previously encoded information (e.g., Murray, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 
2011; Sakaki, Kuhbandner, Mather, & Pekrun, 2014), and retrieval-induced forgetting of 
previously encoded information as a consequence of repeatedly retrieving related information 
(e.g., Barber & Mather, 2012; Barnier, Hung, & Conway, 2004; Kuhbandner, Bäuml, & Stiedl, 
2009), appear not to differ for memories of emotionally significant and neutral stimuli.  
Furthermore, memory-enhancing effects of emotional significance do not occur across 
all elements of an emotional event. A prominent example is the so-called “weapon focus effect” 
where the weapon in a crime scene is remembered with great clarity, but at the expense of other 
crucial details of the scene (e.g., Stanny & Johnson, 2000). Typically, when a visual scene 
contains an emotionally significant stimulus, a memory trade-off is observed: enhanced 
memory for the emotionally significant stimulus, but no memory enhancement or even reduced 
memory for background information and peripheral details present in the same visual scene 
(e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007a; Waring & 
Kensinger, 2011; for reviews see Kensinger, 2009; Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Mather, 2007; 
Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). Similarly, when studying paired associates, item memory for an emo-
tionally significant image or word is typically enhanced, but memory for the associate reduced, 
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compared to paired associates consisting of two neutral stimuli (e.g., Bisby & Burgess, 2014; 
Madan, Caplan, Lau, & Fujiwara, 2012; Nashiro & Mather, 2011; but see Guillet & Arndt, 
2009, for a contradictory finding). Importantly, several studies monitored participants’ eye 
movements and suggested that selective visual attention towards emotion-eliciting elements of 
a scene cannot fully account for the memory trade-offs (Riggs, McQuiggan, Farb, Anderson, & 
Ryan, 2011; Steinmetz & Kensinger, 2013). In fact, as the formation of single-item memory 
and the formation of associations between stimuli seem to rely on distinct mechanisms (e.g., 
Bisby & Burgess, 2014; Davachi, 2006; Giovanello, Schnyer, & Verfaellie, 2004; Giovanello, 
Verfaellie, & Keane, 2003; Hannula et al., 2015), conditions that benefit the two types of 
memory formation do not necessarily coincide. Thus, while emotionally significant stimuli are 
preferentially stored in memory, this may come at the expense of weakened associations to 
other stimuli that were present in the same scene. 
Memory for Personally Experienced Events 
Besides being often emotionally significant, memories of personally experienced events 
(i.e., autobiographical memories) differ from other memory representations in several ways. 
Autobiographical memories exhibit a high degree of self-relevance and a high degree of con-
nectivity in an associative network (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Holland & Kensinger, 
2010). Self-relevance and personal involvement are important factors in forming and modu-
lating memory. Many studies have shown that memory performance increases if information is 
encoded in reference to the self (e.g., “does the information describe yourself?”) (e.g., Kelley 
et al., 2002; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Reeder, McCormick, & Esselman, 1987; Rogers, Kuiper, 
& Kirker, 1977; for a review, see Symons & Johnson, 1997). Personal involvement also seems 
to play a vital role in the retention and vividness of autobiographical memories. For instance, 
Muscatell, Addis, and Kensinger (2010) found that hockey players remembered events in which 
they were directly involved more vividly (e.g., scoring a goal compared to watching a goal from 
the bench).  
Autobiographical memories are assumed to be strongly connected to personal goals, 
motives, and self-images (Conway, 2005; Conway & Williams, 2008). One of the main func-
tions of autobiographical memory, in addition to guiding future behavior and facilitating social 
relationships, is to maintain a coherent sense of self over time (for a review, see Bluck, Alea, 
Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). Memories of specific events are thought to be embedded in a rich 
context of more abstract knowledge about oneself and the personal past and, as such, strongly 
interconnected in an associative network. More precisely, autobiographical memory is thought 
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to be hierarchically organized, with major lifetime periods at the top level, temporally extended 
events (e.g., a vacation) and repeated categories of events (e.g., every Christmas) at the inter-
mediate level, and memories of specific episodes at the bottom level. At retrieval, rather than 
depicting a perfect record of experienced events, memories are reconstructed from this rich 
database of knowledge about oneself (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway & Williams, 
2008).  
The emotional enhancement effect described in the previous section is also evident in 
autobiographical memory. Emotionally significant experiences are remembered more vividly 
and more durably (e.g., Rubin & Kozin, 1984; White, 2002; for a review, see Holland 
& Kensinger, 2010), and experienced as more personally relevant than neutral memories (e.g., 
Barnier et al., 2004, 2007; Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Ritchie, 2009). A functional 
explanation of emotional memory enhancement in autobiographical memory rests upon the as-
sumption that emotional significance signals the importance of an experience for goals that are 
vital for the self (Levine & Edelstein, 2009). In this regard, it has also been observed that more 
memories of emotionally positive experiences than of emotionally negative experiences tend to 
be recalled, and that negative affect seems to fade faster over time than positive affect (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Thompson, Skowronski, Larsen, & Betz, 1996; Walker, Vogl, & 
Thompson, 1997; for reviews see Walker & Skowronski, 2009; Walker, Skowronski, & 
Thompson, 2003). Self-regulatory functions may cause negative affect to fade more rapidly, 
making negative autobiographical memories less accessible. Moreover, as people are generally 
motivated to maintain a positive self-concept, emotionally positive autobiographical memories 
may become integrated into people’s self-concepts more easily (Holland & Kensinger, 2010).  
Affective States and Memory 
Besides the question to what extent memory for emotionally significant events differs 
from memory for neutral events, another crucial question regarding affective influences on 
memory is whether an individual’s current affective state influences memory processes, regard-
less of the emotional significance of the information being processed. 
Two frequently observed effects of affective states on memory are mood-congruent 
memory and mood-dependent memory. Mood-congruent memory refers to the phenomenon 
that emotional contents matching the current affective state are more easily processed. Mood-
dependent memory means that (neutral) information is more easily retrieved if the affective 
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state at retrieval matches the affective state at encoding (for a review of research on both phe-
nomena, see Eich & Forgas, 2003). These phenomena have been explained by means of a net-
work-theory, suggesting that humans encode their affective experience in an associative net-
work together with the elements of the situation in which the affect has been experienced 
(Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2000). Thus, because of spreading activation through the net-
work, information that is linked to an affective experience is more likely to be recalled when 
the same affect is experienced. Conversely, affective experiences are more likely to be rein-
stated when associated information is activated. Interestingly, some studies also demonstrate 
the opposite effect, mood-incongruent memory, which refers to better recall of memories with 
opposite emotional valence than the currently experienced affective state. Mood-incongruent 
memory is observed predominantly in negative affective states. Therefore, it might be a self-
regulatory mood-repair mechanism that helps to avoid prolonged negative affective states (for 
reviews, see Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Morris & Reilly, 1987). 
Another prominent assumption concerning the effects of affective states on cognition is 
that, dependent on current affective state, different cognitive processing styles are adopted. 
More specifically, it is assumed that negative affect fosters a predominantly item-specific pro-
cessing style, focusing on details and distinctive attributes of an item, whereas positive affect 
fosters a predominantly relational processing style, focusing on associations between items in 
relation to other concepts in memory (for reviews, see Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; 2009; Fiedler 
& Hütter, 2014). Research has shown affective influences on processing styles from the earliest 
pre-attentive stages of information processing to several higher stages such as attentional selec-
tion, feature binding in working memory, and activation of associative knowledge structures. 
Regarding attention, positive affect seems to broaden the scope of attention, and nega-
tive affect to narrow it (for a review, see Vanlessen, De Raedt, Koster, & Pourtois, 2016). For 
instance, positive affect has been shown to enhance the amount of information temporarily 
available in iconic memory by reducing spatial biases (Kuhbandner, Lichtenfeld, & Pekrun, 
2011), to enhance access to remote semantic associations (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007), to 
induce a global bias in visual perception (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005), but to impair visual 
selective attention (Rowe et al., 2007). Regarding feature binding and storage of visual infor-
mation, positive affect seems to foster the storage of integrated object representations and nega-
tive affect seems to foster the storage of independent feature representations (Spachtholz & 
Kuhbandner, 2017; Spachtholz, Kuhbandner, & Pekrun, 2016). Finally, regarding processing 
in relation to existing knowledge structures, positive affect tends to promote the activation of 
schemata and the spreading of activation through associative networks in memory, whereas 
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negative affect tends to inhibit both. For example, studies demonstrate that when experiencing 
positive affect, broader thought-action-repertoires (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) and more 
flexible problem-solving strategies (Haager, Kuhbandner, & Pekrun, 2014) are accessible, and 
intentionally forgotten memories are reactivated (Bäuml & Kuhbandner, 2009). By contrary, 
when experiencing negative affect, stereotypes are less likely activated (Huntsinger, Sinclair, 
& Clore, 2009), cognitive priming is inhibited (Storbeck & Clore, 2008), and false memories 
are reduced (Storbeck, 2013).  
On a functional level, these effects of affective states on processing styles are supposed 
to adjust the cognitive system according to the respective demands of the current situation. In 
particular, positive affect signals a benign environment, allowing the individual to stick to a 
heuristic, schema-driven processing style (e.g., Schwarz, 2012) that frees cognitive resources 
and permits a momentary broadening of information processing, thus contributing to an adap-
tive expansion of cognitive and action repertoires (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; 2004). Negative 
affect, on the other hand,  acts as a metaphorical stop sign, signaling a problematic environment 
in which the default mode of heuristic processing based on inner knowledge structures and 
schemes may not be adaptive, and more careful processing of the environment and its details is 
necessary (e.g., Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). These opposing effects of affective states on cog-
nitive processing have also been described in terms of two complementary adaptive functions: 
assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation refers to the interpretation of environmental in-
formation based on existing internal schemes and knowledge structures, whereas accommoda-
tion refers to the updating of internal knowledge structures according to novel environmental 
information (e.g., Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler & Hütter, 2014; see Piaget, 1954).  
The Present Studies  
Albeit previous research has shown a wide range of emotional influences on memory 
(for reviews, see e.g., Fiedler & Hütter, 2014; Kensinger, 2009; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004), the 
question whether emotions may potentially influence the mnemonic benefits of testing has been 
largely left unattended. The present research set out to fill this research gap. For this purpose, 
three studies were conducted. 
STUDY 1 addressed the question whether the effect of testing, compared to restudying, 
may differ for emotionally significant stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. Numerous studies 
indicate that emotionally significant stimuli may be preferentially stored in memory (for a re-
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view, see Kensinger, 2009), but some previous studies found largely similar effects on emo-
tionally significant and neutral stimuli for factors known to influence memories after initial 
encoding (e.g., Kuhbandner et al., 2009; Sakaki et al., 2014; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). 
Concerning post-encoding factors, to date only factors with detrimental consequences for later 
memory have been investigated and it is unknown whether emotional significance may influ-
ence factors that are beneficial for later memory, such as the testing of previously encoded 
information. In order to examine whether the testing effect is modulated by emotional signifi-
cance, a standard cued recall testing-effect paradigm was employed. Participants studied either 
emotionally negative or neutral target stimuli together with neutral retrieval cues, and were 
subsequently tested via the retrieval cues, or restudied the cue-target pairs. After 1 week, in 
order to measure both the ability to access the target stimuli via the cue-target association and 
the availability of the targets in memory independently of the cue, a two-stage memory test was 
employed. As memory enhancements for emotionally significant stimuli often come at the ex-
pense of weakened associations to other stimuli present in the same scene (for a review, see 
Kensinger, 2009; Mather, 2007), it was expected that, despite increased storage strength of 
negative memories, the benefit received from testing would be similar or even decreased for 
the negative stimuli compared to the neutral ones.  
STUDY 2 examined whether the testing effect extends to emotional and neutral mem-
ories of personally experienced events. Autobiographical memories, besides being often emo-
tionally significant and personally relevant, stand out due to a high degree of complexity and 
interconnectedness in an associative network (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Holland & Kensinger, 2010). Due to these characteristics, re-exposure and retrieval prac-
tice may induce the same benefit to autobiographical memory recall and the typical pattern of 
the testing effect may be attenuated, or if at all only appear after longer retention intervals (see 
Kornell et al., 2011, 2015; Symons & Johnson, 1997; Van Gog & Sweller, 2015). To examine 
the testing effect for autobiographical memories, an experimental procedure (adapted from 
Barnier et al., 2004) was employed where participants initially collected memories for person-
ally experienced events in response to emotionally negative, emotionally positive, or neutral 
cue words. On the following day, participants repeatedly restudied or repeatedly retrieved their 
memories. Memory for all initially collected events was assessed 2 weeks and 13 weeks after 
restudying/testing. It was hypothesized that the testing effect may disappear for memories of 
personally experienced events, or, if at all, only emerge after the longer retention interval of 
13 weeks.  
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Finally, STUDY 3 addressed the question whether the affective state that learners ex-
perience during studying and testing of neutral information may modulate the testing effect. As 
described previously, research has shown that an individual’s currently experienced affective 
state can influence the adopted processing styles (for a review, see Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; 
Fiedler & Hütter, 2014). Differences in adopted processing style may in turn modulate the bene-
fit received from testing. Elaborative processing during retrieval is assumed to underlie the 
beneficial effects of testing (e.g., Carpenter, 2009, 2011; Kornell et al., 2015; Pyc & Rawson, 
2010). Therefore, negative affect, which promotes item-specific processing and attenuates ac-
tivation, may decrease the testing effect. In contrast, positive affect, which promotes relational 
processing and enlarges the spreading of activation, may increase the testing effect. To examine 
this hypothesis, two experiments were conducted. Emotionally negative, emotionally positive, 
or neutral affective states were induced either already before initial studying (Experiment 1) or 
directly before restudying/testing (Experiment 2). It was expected that in a 1-week delayed free 
recall test the typical pattern of the testing effect would emerge in the neutral affect condition, 
and that compared to the neutral affect condition, the advantage of testing compared to restudy-
ing would be increased in the positive affect condition and decreased in the negative affect 
condition.
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Abstract 
A large body of research shows that emotionally significant stimuli are better stored in 
memory. One question that has received much less attention is how emotional memories are 
influenced by factors that influence memories after the initial encoding of stimuli. Intriguingly, 
several recent studies suggest that post-encoding factors do not differ in their effects on emo-
tional and neutral memories. However, to date, only detrimental factors have been addressed. 
In the present study, we examined whether emotionally negative memories are differentially 
influenced by a well-known beneficial factor: the testing of memories. We employed a standard 
cued recall testing-effect paradigm where participants studied cue-target pairs for negative and 
neutral target pictures. In a subsequent post-encoding phase, one third of the cue-target pairs 
were tested and one third restudied; the remaining third served as control pairs. After 1 week, 
memory for all cue-target pairs was tested. While replicating both the testing effect and the 
emotional enhancement effect, no differences between negative and neutral memories in the 
benefits received from testing and restudying were observed. Thus, it seems to be true that post-
encoding factors do not influence emotional memories in any other way than neutral memories, 
even when they are beneficial.  
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A large body of research shows that one of the main factors influencing our memory 
about past events is their emotional significance. Using a wide range of stimuli such as words, 
pictures or narrated slide shows, numerous studies have demonstrated that emotional stimuli 
are better remembered than neutral stimuli (for a review, see Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). In par-
ticular, an advantage of emotional over neutral stimuli occurs across all information processing 
stages, even down to earliest stages such as sensory-memory (Kuhbandner, Spitzer, & Pekrun, 
2011), and up to later stages such as the consolidation and retrieval of information in long-term 
memory (for a review, see LaBar & Cabeza, 2006). Thus, emotional stimuli seem to be prefer-
entially stored in memory. 
One question that has received much less attention is how emotional memories are in-
fluenced by factors that are known to influence memories after the initial encoding of stimuli. 
Intriguingly, other than at the level of initial encoding, several studies suggest that negative and 
neutral memories do not differ in the effects of post-encoding factors. For instance, the effects 
of factors such as the attempt to intentionally forget memories (i.e., directed forgetting; Wessel 
& Merckelbach, 2006), the intentional exclusion of memories from awareness (i.e., think/no-
think forgetting; Sakaki et al., 2014), or the retrieving of related distracting memories (i.e., 
retrieval-induced forgetting; Kuhbandner et al., 2009) are largely similar for neutral and nega-
tive memories. 
However, one characteristic that is common to all of the above mentioned post-encoding 
factors is that the effects are detrimental for stored memories, which all seem to reflect the 
memory consequences of inhibition – inhibition of (1) outdated memories (directed forgetting; 
MacLeod, 1998), inhibition of memories to intentionally exclude them from current awareness 
(think/no-think forgetting; Anderson & Green, 2001), and inhibition of distracting memories 
(retrieval-induced forgetting; Anderson, 2003). Thus, it may be that effects of negative emo-
tions are found when factors are examined which are beneficial for stored memories and are 
based on cognitive mechanisms other than inhibition. One post-encoding factor that has been 
shown to be especially beneficial is the testing of memories. As revealed by numerous studies, 
retrieving an event from memory in a test provides a powerful boost for long-term memory of 
that event, a benefit that is even larger than the benefit received from repeatedly restudying the 
event (i.e., the testing effect; Carrier & Pashler, 1992), and which is commonly attributed to the 
fact that testing involves a more elaborative and deeper processing that enhances long-term 
retention (for a review, see Roediger & Butler, 2011). Interestingly, although the beneficial 
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effect of testing has been examined using a large variety of materials (e.g., wordlists, vocabu-
lary, prose texts), to our knowledge, the effect of testing memories for emotionally negative 
stimuli has not been examined to date.  
At first glance, it may seem clear that the beneficial effect of testing should be larger for 
negative than for neutral stimuli. Due to preferential encoding, negative stimuli may be more 
likely retrieved in a test, which may lead to an increased testing effect because memories can 
only benefit from testing when they are successfully retrieved (Kornell et al., 2011). Further-
more, one may additionally assume that the benefit received from successful retrieval may be 
larger for negative than for neutral stimuli, similar to the memory advantage of negative over 
neutral stimuli found during initial encoding. However, a closer look suggests that such an as-
sumption may be premature. As shown in several studies, when a visual scene contains a nega-
tive stimulus, the preferential encoding of negative stimuli leads to high storage strength for the 
stimulus itself. However, this benefit in stimulus-related storage strength comes at the cost of 
weakened associations to memories for other stimuli that were present in the same visual scene 
(e.g., Bisby & Burgess, 2014; Madan et al., 2012; for a review, see Mather, 2007). Regarding 
the beneficial effects of testing, this may have two detrimental consequences. 
First, in order to be able to test one’s memory about the presence of a stimulus in a past 
scene, other stimuli that were present in the same scene have to be used as retrieval cues. Thus, 
for the successful retrieval of memories in a test, high storage strength of the to-be-retrieved 
memory is not enough. Rather, successful retrieval additionally presupposes that the association 
between retrieval cues and to-be-retrieved memories is strong enough so that the memories can 
be accessed via the cues. Accordingly, despite the fact that negative stimuli are preferentially 
stored in memory, this does not necessarily mean that they are more likely retrieved in a test 
where memory is accessed via retrieval cues. Second, in case of successful retrieval, it may be 
that even if the test-induced benefit in storage strength is larger for negative than for neutral 
stimuli, the benefit at the level of associations may be smaller due to the attention-grabbing 
nature of emotional stimuli, so that overall no difference in the benefit received from testing is 
observed. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of testing negative memories 
on long-term memory for those stimuli. We employed a standard cued recall testing-effect para-
digm and varied the emotional significance of the to-be-studied stimuli. Participants first stud-
ied pairs consisting of a neutral or negative real-life picture (target) and a picture-independent 
visual cue. In a subsequent phase, for one third of the cue-target pairs, only the cues were pre-
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sented, and participants were asked to retrieve the associated targets (testing condition). An-
other third of the cue-target pairs was completely presented, and participants were asked to 
restudy the pairs (restudy condition). The remaining third did not appear in this phase and 
served as a baseline for the benefits gained from testing and restudying (control condition).  
After 1 week, memory for all cue-target pairs was tested in a delayed memory test. In 
order to measure both the ability to access the target pictures via the association formed during 
study between the target picture and the cue and the availability of the target pictures in memory 
independently of the cue, a two-stage memory test was used. In an initial test, a cued recall test 
was administered where pictures had to be retrieved via provided cues. In a subsequent free 
recall test, participants were asked to additionally recall all of the target pictures they remem-
bered independently of the cues (for an illustration, see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Procedure of the experiment. In an initial study phase, 24 negative and 24 neutral 
object-picture pairs were presented in random order. In a subsequent post-encoding phase, for 
one third of the pairs, the object was presented with the instruction to remember the associated 
picture (testing condition), and one third was completely presented again with the instruction 
to restudy the pairs (restudy condition); the remaining third did not appear in this phase (control 
condition). After 1 week, memory for all object-picture pairs was tested. In an initial cued recall 
test, all objects were presented with the instruction to recall the associated pictures. In a subse-
quent free recall test, participants were instructed to write down further pictures they could 
recall regardless of the associated object.  
 
For neutral target stimuli, we expected to replicate the typical testing effect; that is, 
memory for the cue-target pairs in the delayed test after 1 week should be higher for tested than 
for restudied and control targets. Furthermore, we expected to replicate previous findings on 
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memory for negative stimuli; that is, the availability of the target pictures in memory inde-
pendently of the cue should be enhanced for negative compared to neutral targets, but the ability 
to access target pictures via the picture-independent cue should be decreased for negative com-
pared to neutral targets due to the detrimental effect of negative emotional significance on as-
sociative memory. Thus, as a net effect, cued recall memory performance should be similar, or 
even decreased, for negative compared to neutral targets. As a consequence, given that the suc-
cessful retrieval of a memory is a prerequisite for the occurrence of a testing benefit, we hy-
pothesized that, despite the increased actual storage strength of negative memories, the benefit 
received from testing should be similar or even decreased for negative compared to neutral 
stimuli. 
Method 
Participants 
A power analysis revealed that to achieve a power of .80 for detecting small to medium 
sized effects (dependent t-test, d = 0.35, α = .05; G*Power 3.1.7; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007), a sample size of at least 52 would be required. Thus, we decided to recruit 60 
undergraduates (39 females, 21 males; Mage = 21.4, SD = 2.3) who participated for course 
credit. All participants provided written informed consent. The study was approved by the 
Ethics Committee of the University of Regensburg, and conducted in accordance with the Hel-
sinki declaration. All data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study are re-
ported. 
Material 
The materials involved 48 negative and 48 neutral real-life target pictures. Each of the 
negative pictures was yoked with one neutral real-life picture that was visually similar but not 
arousing (taken from Mather & Nesmith, 2008). The resulting 48 negative/neutral picture pairs 
were grouped into three sets of 16 pairs each. Each set was assigned to one of three post-
encoding conditions (testing, restudy, control); the assignment was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. Each participant was shown only one picture from each pair, resulting in eight nega-
tive and eight neutral target pictures in each post-encoding condition; the version that was 
shown was also counterbalanced across participants. The target pictures were randomly paired 
with 48 neutral objects selected from the revised colorful version of the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart picture set (Rossion & Pourtois, 2004) that served as visual cues for the later 
memory tests on target picture memory. Stimuli and instructions were presented on a computer 
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screen using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA), and participants were 
provided with booklets in the post-encoding and the delayed memory test phases. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment involved a study phase, a restudy/testing phase, and a delayed memory 
test phase that took place after 1 week. All participants were tested individually in separate 
cubicles. In the study phase, the 48 object-picture pairs were shown one by one for 12 s each. 
In order to control for order effects and prevent the induction of negative moods, the object-
picture pairs were presented in random order, irrespective of emotional significance and post-
encoding condition. Participants were instructed that they would see 48 object-picture pairs, 
and that they should memorize the pairs for a memory test 1 week later. They were told that it 
may be helpful to combine the objects and pictures in their imagination. It was not mentioned 
that only the pictures would be tested later via the objects as retrieval cues. 
After the study phase, the restudy/testing phase followed. Participants were tested on 
one third of the studied object-picture pairs (testing condition) and restudied another third of 
the object-picture pairs (restudy condition). The remaining third of pairs did not appear in this 
phase and served as a baseline for the benefits gained from testing and restudying (control con-
dition). The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants. In the testing condi-
tion, the objects were shown one by one in random order, and participants were asked to recall 
the associated pictures. Participants did not receive any feedback. In the restudy condition, the 
object-picture pairs were completely presented in random order, and participants were asked to 
restudy the object-picture pairs. In both conditions, participants were instructed to write down 
a short description of the objects and pictures into their booklet within 20 s. The restudy/testing 
cycle was repeated three times. Afterwards, participants were thanked and asked to return to 
the laboratory 1 week later for a delayed memory test. 
In the delayed memory test phase after 1 week, participants’ memory for all target pic-
tures was tested, irrespective of post-encoding conditions. For this purpose, all objects were 
presented one by one in random order. Participants were asked to recall the associated picture, 
and write a short description of both the object and the picture into their booklet. By pressing 
the space key, participants could move to the next object; after 20 s, the next object was pre-
sented automatically. Subsequent to the cued recall test, participants were asked if they could 
recall any further pictures without remembering the associated object, and instructed to write 
down a short description of these pictures without any time restrictions. Finally, all 48 previ-
ously shown target pictures were presented again in random order, and participants rated their 
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valence (1 = extremely negative, 9 = extremely positive) and arousal (1 = low arousal, 9 = high 
arousal) using the affect grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989), which was shown nearby 
the picture.  
Scoring 
All tests were scored independently by two raters. Target picture descriptions that could 
unambiguously be assigned to the corresponding target picture were scored as correctly remem-
bered; missing target descriptions and vague, not interpretable descriptions were scored as not 
remembered. Cohen's Kappa (κ) was performed to determine consistency among raters and 
indicated high inter-rater reliability, κ = .98 (p < .001), 95% CI [0.979, 0.987]. 
Results 
Emotional Ratings 
Compared to neutral pictures, participants rated negative pictures as both more negative 
(MNeutral = 5.53, SD = 0.48 vs. MNegative = 2.38, SD = 0.66), t(59) = 32.22, p < .001, gav = 5.40, 
and more arousing (MNeutral = 4.97, SD = 0.77 vs. MNegative = 6.60, SD = 1.10), t(59) = −11.49, 
p < .001, gav = 1.70. 
Immediate Memory Test 
For the three immediate cued recall tests in the restudy/testing phase, a 3 (Test Number: 
test 1, test 2, test 3) × 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) repeated-measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on correct recall rates. Results showed that there were neither main 
effects of Test Number, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F(1.63, 96.16) = 0.07, 
p = .899,  ηp
2 = .001, nor of Emotion, F(1, 59) = 2.08, p = .155, ηp
2 = .034, nor a significant Test 
Number × Emotion interaction, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F(1.80, 106.33) = 0.50, p = .591, 
ηp
2 = .008. Thus, correct recall rates stayed roughly the same throughout the three tests (M = .77, 
SD = .20 vs. M = .77, SD = .19 vs. M = .77, SD = .19), and did not significantly differ for 
negative targets compared to neutral targets (MNegative = .75, SD = .21 vs. MNeutral = .79, 
SD = .22, collapsed over the three tests).  
  
36 STUDY 1: Testing Emotional Memories 
Delayed Memory Test after 1 Week 
Memory performance in the delayed memory test as a function of emotion (negative, 
neutral), post-encoding condition (control, restudy, testing), and type of memory test (cued re-
call test, free recall test) is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Memory performance after 1 week. (A) Performance in the cued recall test. Probabil-
ity of recall of target pictures as a function of post-encoding condition (control, restudy, testing) 
and emotion (negative, neutral) is shown in the left panels. Conditional probabilities of recall 
given successful recall in the immediate test 1 week before are shown in the right panel. Grey 
bars show the proportion of pictures correctly recalled; black bars show the proportion of pic-
tures misattributed to the wrong cue. (B) Performance in the free recall test. Probability of recall 
of target pictures as a function of post-encoding condition (control, restudy, testing) and emo-
tion (negative, neutral) is shown in the left panels. Conditional probabilities of recall given 
successful recall in the immediate test 1 week before are shown in the right panel.  
 
Cued recall test. First, the proportion of targets was determined that was correctly re-
trieved in the initial cued recall test via the provided retrieval cues (see Fig. 2A, grey bars). A 
3 (Post-Encoding Condition: control, restudy, testing) × 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) re-
peated-measure ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Post-Encoding Condition, F(2, 
118) = 219.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .788. The proportion of targets that could be accessed via the re-
trieval cue was higher for restudied targets than for control targets (MRestudy = .49, SD = .24 vs. 
MControl = .08, SD = .10), t(59) = 14.91 p < .001, gav = 2.23, and higher for tested targets 
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(MTesting = .59, SD = .22) than for both control targets, t(59) = 18.88, p < .001, gav = 2.94, and 
restudied targets, t(59) = 4.18, p < .001, gav = 0.41, thus replicating the typical testing effect. 
However, no main effect was found for Emotion (MNeutral = .39, SD = .16 vs. MNegative = .38, 
SD = .18, collapsed over post-encoding conditions), F(1, 59) = 0.40, p = .523, ηp
2 = .007, neither 
was there a significant Post-Encoding Condition × Emotion interaction, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected F(1.67, 98.68) = 1.62, p = .202, ηp
2 = .027.  
In addition to veridical recall in the cued recall test, we also examined misattributions 
(i.e., target pictures that were falsely retrieved in answer to a retrieval cue). The proportion of 
misattributions is shown by the black bars in Figure 2A. A 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) × 3 
(Post-Encoding Condition: control, restudy, testing) repeated-measure ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of Emotion, F(1, 59) = 9.74, p = .003, ηp
2 = .142. Collapsed across all post-
encoding conditions, more negative than neutral target pictures were misattributed (MNegative = 
.05, SD = .05 vs. MNeutral = .03, SD = .03). There was no significant main effect of Post-
Encoding Condition, F(2, 118) = 2.72, p = .070, ηp
2 = .044, and no significant Post-Encoding 
condition × Emotion interaction, F (2, 118) = 0.18, p = .840, ηp
2 = .003.  
Free recall test. Memory performance in the subsequent free recall test for the target 
pictures is shown in Figure 2B. A repeated-measure ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of Emotion, F(1, 59) = 6.41, p = .014, ηp
2 = .098. Collapsed across all post-encoding conditions, 
more negative than neutral target pictures were additionally remembered independently of the 
cues (MNegative = .03, SD = .05 vs. MNeutral = .01, SD = .03). There was also a significant main 
effect of Post-Encoding Condition, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F(1.70, 100.07) = 5.20, 
p = .010, ηp
2 = .081. Free recall rates were significantly higher for restudied targets (MRestudy = 
.03, SD = .05) than for control targets (MControl = .01, SD = .03), t(59) = 2.77, p = .008, gav = 
0.48, and tested targets (MTesting = .02, SD = .04), t(59) = 2.08, p = .042, gav = 0.30. Free recall 
rates did not significantly differ between tested targets and control targets, t(59) = 1.23, p = 
.224, gav = 0.19. There was no Post-Encoding Condition × Emotion interaction, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected F(1.60, 94.31) = 1.43, p = .243, ηp
2 = .024. 
Conditional memory performance. Finally, we restricted the analysis to target pic-
tures that were successfully retrieved in the immediate test; that is, we determined the condi-
tional probabilities of recall in the delayed memory test given successful recall in the immediate 
test (see Fig. 2, right bars). Conditional probabilities of veridical recall in the cued recall test 
did not significantly differ for neutral targets compared to negative targets (MNeutral = .76, SD = 
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.20 vs. MNegative = .72, SD = .23), t(59) = 1.46, p = .150, gav = 0.17, neither did conditional prob-
abilities of misattributions in the cued recall test (MNeutral = .03, SD = .08 vs. MNegative = .06, 
SD = .11), t(59) = −1.28, p = .207, gav = 0.22, nor conditional probabilities of veridical recall 
in the subsequent free recall test (MNeutral = .01 SD = .05 vs. MNegative = .02, SD = .08), t(59) = 
−1.05, p = .300, gav = 0.16. 
Discussion 
Basically, the results of the present study replicate two well-documented memory phe-
nomena. For neutral target pictures, a typical testing effect pattern was observed: Long-term 
memory for the cue-picture pairs was higher for initially tested cue-picture pairs than for ini-
tially restudied cue-picture pairs (for a review, see Roediger & Butler, 2011). For negative tar-
get pictures, a typical emotional memory enhancement pattern was observed: The availability 
of the target pictures in memory independently of the cue was enhanced for negative compared 
to neutral targets, as evident both in the increased number of negative target pictures that were 
remembered in the cue-independent free recall and the increased number of negative target 
pictures that were falsely retrieved in answer to a retrieval cue in the cued recall test (misattribu-
tions); however, this boost in storage strength for negative target pictures did not transfer to the 
ability to retrieve stored memories via retrieval cues, as indicated by equal veridical recall rates 
in the cued recall test (for a review, see Mather, 2007). 
Interestingly, although more negative than neutral targets were stored in memory, nega-
tive and neutral targets did not differ in the effects of testing and restudying. Testing and 
restudying increased long-term memory to exactly the same extent for both negative and neutral 
targets, leading to equal testing effects. At first glance, the absence of any effects of negative 
emotion on the testing effect seems to be simply attributable to the fact that emotional signifi-
cance did not influence the ability to retrieve targets via retrieval cues so that equal numbers of 
negative and neutral memories benefited from successful retrieval. However, still, one may 
have expected that the benefit received from successful retrieval for later memory is higher for 
negative than for neutral targets, similar to the emotional effects observed during initial en-
coding. However, the results showed that even the benefit received from successful retrieval 
was equal for negative and neutral targets, as revealed by equal conditional probabilities of 
correct recall in the delayed recall test given successful recall in the immediate test. 
The lack of influences of negative emotions on the effects of testing or restudying pre-
viously stored items is in line with previous findings, suggesting that the emotional memory 
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enhancement effect is limited to initial encoding, while post-encoding factors seem to affect 
negative memories in no other ways than non-emotional memories (e.g. Kuhbandner et al., 
2009; Sakaki et al., 2014; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). Going beyond previous studies, the 
present findings demonstrate that this holds not only for detrimental post-encoding factors that 
induce forgetting of memories, but also for post-encoding factors that enhance future remem-
bering. 
The present study also raises several questions that should be addressed in future re-
search. First, both in our study on beneficial post-encoding factors and in previous studies on 
detrimental post-encoding factors, emotionally negative materials have been used ( Kuhbandner 
et al., 2009; Sakaki et al., 2014; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). Thus, the question arises 
whether the observed lack of emotional effects generalizes to emotionally positive materials. 
Second, in the present study, non-emotional cues have been used to access memories that were 
unrelated to the depicted target picture. While this seems rather typical for real-life contexts 
such as witness interviewing where emotional memories are accessed via other stimuli that were 
present in the scene, the situation may be different when cues are used that are part of the emo-
tional target itself. In such a case, emotions have been demonstrated to boost not only target 
memory, but also the associations to the cue (e.g., Mather, 2007). Thus, under such conditions, 
an increased testing effect for negative stimuli may occur.  
Conclusion 
The emotional significance of stimuli has been shown to impact all stages of information 
processing from perception to memory. However, such emotional effects seem to be restricted 
to the phase of initial encoding of stimuli in memory. As revealed by the present study, and 
consistent with previous studies on detrimental post-encoding factors, factors that are known to 
influence memories after the initial encoding took place seem not to be modulated by the emo-
tional significance of stimuli. While replicating the testing effect as well as the emotional en-
hancement effect, we did not find any difference between negative and neutral memories in the 
benefit received from testing and restudying. Hence, post-encoding factors seem not to affect 
negative memories in any other way than neutral memories. 
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Abstract 
Numerous studies have shown that retrieving contents from memory in a test improves 
long-term retention for those contents, even when compared to restudying (i.e., the testing 
effect). The beneficial effect of retrieval practice has been demonstrated for many different 
types of memory representations; however, one particularly important memory system has not 
been addressed in previous testing-effect research: autobiographical memory. The aim of the 
present study was to examine the effect of retrieving memories for personally experienced 
events on long-term memory for those events. In an initial elicitation session, participants de-
scribed memories for personally experienced events in response to a variety of cue words. In a 
retrieval practice/restudy session the following day, they repeatedly practiced retrieval for half 
of their memories by recalling and writing down the previously described events; the other half 
of memories was restudied by rereading and copying the event descriptions. Long-term reten-
tion of all previously collected memories was assessed at two different retention intervals (2 
weeks and 13 weeks). In the retrieval practice session, a hypermnesic effect emerged, with 
memory performance increasing across the practice cycles. Long-term memory performance 
significantly dropped from the 2-week to the 13-week retention interval, but no significant dif-
ference in memory performance was observed between previously repeatedly retrieved and pre-
viously repeatedly restudied memories. Thus, in autobiographical memory, retrieval practice 
seems to be no more beneficial for long-term retention than repeated re-exposure. 
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Numerous studies have shown that retrieving contents from memory in a test consider-
ably improves long-term memory for those contents, even when compared to a condition where 
the contents are represented for restudying (i.e., the “testing effect,” Carrier & Pashler, 1992; 
for recent meta-analyses see Adesope et al., 2017; Rowland, 2014). The beneficial effect of 
retrieval practice has been demonstrated for a wide range of test formats (e.g., cued recall, free 
recall, recognition memory), for a large variety of study materials (e.g., wordlists, vocabulary, 
prose texts), and even extends to procedural skills (Kromann et al., 2009) and emotional mem-
ories (Emmerdinger, Kuhbandner, & Berchtold, 2018). However, previous research in the field 
has neglected one particularly important memory system: autobiographical memory. While a 
few studies have examined the effect of retrieving autobiographical events from memory com-
pared to non-retrieved autobiographical events (Barnier et al., 2004; Stone, Barnier, Sutton, & 
Hirst, 2013), to our knowledge, no study to date has examined the effect of testing auto-
biographical memories compared to repeated re-exposure to those memories.  
Autobiographical memories, the recollections of personally experienced events, are a 
unique type of memory representations characterized by a high degree of complexity and a 
strong interconnectedness in an associative network. Autobiographical memories are thought 
to be hierarchically organized, such that detailed recollections of specific events are embedded 
in a rich context of more abstract knowledge about the personal past (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). Importantly, autobiographical memories are also highly linked to the self, thus 
interrelated with personal motives and evaluations, and often emotionally significant (Conway, 
2005). 
It is an open question if the retrieval benefits reliably observed for non-personal learning 
materials persist for personal, self-related information. Generally, it has been shown that previ-
ously retrieved autobiographical events are better retained than non-retrieved autobiographical 
events (Barnier et al., 2004; Stone et al., 2013). However, less is known regarding the relative 
significance of retrieving personally experienced events compared to re-exposure to those 
events, as may occur for example when listening to rehearsals of socially shared personally 
experienced events in conversations. Interestingly, there is some evidence that retrieving so-
cially shared personally experienced events in the role of the speaker benefits memory retention 
similarly to being re-exposed to those events in the role of the listener (Stone et al., 2013). This 
finding may hint at the possibility that retrieval practice may not necessarily benefit long-term 
memory for personally experienced events more than repeated re-exposure to those events.  
Indeed, based on theoretical accounts of why retrieving information in a test benefits 
long-term memory, one may speculate that the testing effect may be less pronounced or even 
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disappear for autobiographical memories of personally experienced events. Existing explana-
tions for the testing effect rest upon the assumption that the successful retrieval of a memory 
initiates elaborative processes that update and strengthen the memory trace through the estab-
lishment of new relations (Carpenter, 2009, 2011; Kornell et al., 2015; Pyc & Rawson, 2010). 
However, this benefit received from testing may be reduced or even absent for autobiographical 
memories, which typically exhibit inherently strong links in an associative network. In fact, 
recent studies failed to replicate the testing effect for complex, highly associated materials (De 
Jonge et al., 2015; Van Gog et al., 2015; for a review, see Van Gog & Sweller, 2015). For 
example, in the study of De Jonge et al. (2015), while taking a test on a previously studied 
strongly interrelated text did not benefit memory any more than restudying the text, the typical 
retrieval benefit did emerge when the same text was scrambled and presented for studying and 
retrieval practice as single, nonrelated facts. On the other hand, a simple re-exposure to the 
material, as typically realized in the restudy condition, may benefit memory for personally rele-
vant information more than memory for non-personal information. Numerous studies have 
shown increased memory performance for information that is relevant to the self (for a review, 
see Symons & Johnson, 1997). Due to the highly associatively organized and self-related nature 
of autobiographical memory representations, repeated re-exposure alone may lead to similar 
memory benefits than actively retrieving the information, and in consequence, attenuate the 
typical pattern of the testing effect. Following a distribution-based perspective (Kornell et al., 
2011), the testing effect may thus emerge, if at all, only after comparably long retention inter-
vals, because not only previously successfully retrieved, but also restudied memory represen-
tations would stay rather long well above the recall threshold.  
In the current study, we extended the testing-effect paradigm to autobiographical mem-
ories. For this purpose, we adapted an experimental procedure developed by Barnier et al. 
(2004) using autobiographical memories for personally experienced events elicited in response 
to cue words. The present experiment consisted of four sessions: An initial collection session, 
a retrieval practice/restudy session the following day, and two delayed memory test sessions at 
different retention intervals (2 weeks and 13 weeks). In the collection session, participants were 
asked to describe events they had personally experienced in the last 6 months in response to a 
variety of cue words. To control for possible effects of emotional significance, one third of the 
cue words was emotionally negative, one third neutral, and the remaining third positive. The 
retrieval practice/restudy session took place 1 day after the collection session. Each participant 
was provided with the descriptions of half of his or her personal events of each emotional qual-
ity together with the corresponding cue for restudy. Participants were asked to carefully read 
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the cue word and the event description and copy the event description by hand. For the other 
half of the events, only the cues were presented, and participants were asked to retrieve and 
write down the corresponding memories. After 2 weeks, we assessed delayed memory perfor-
mance for all originally collected autobiographical events; participants were asked to recall and 
write down all originally described events in response to the corresponding cue words. To con-
trol for the possibility that for autobiographical material the benefit of retrieval practice might 
only emerge after a comparably long retention interval, the delayed memory test was repeated 
13 weeks after the retrieval practice/restudy session.  
Method 
Participants 
A power analysis was performed for sample size estimation and revealed that to achieve 
a power of .80 for detecting small to medium sized effects (d = 0.40, α = .05; G*Power 3.1.7; 
Faul et al., 2007), a sample size of at least 41 would be required. Thus, we decided to recruit 48 
undergraduate students (45 females, MAge = 21.3, SD = 5.5) who participated for course credit. 
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Regensburg. All partici-
pants provided written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Material 
In an initial collection session, participants were asked to describe personally experi-
enced events from the last 6 months in response to cue words. For this purpose, three cue word 
lists were constructed that contained either 36 neutral (e.g., shoe, table, buy), 36 emotionally 
positive (e.g., entertaining, friendship, happiness), or 36 emotionally negative (e.g., sick, quar-
rel, lonely) German words (for the complete cue word lists in German and their English trans-
lations, see Supplementary Material, Table 4). Cue words were selected from previous studies 
using the cue word method for the collection of autobiographical memories (Barnier et al., 
2004, 2007; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 2011; Maccallum, McConkey, Bryant, & Barnier, 2000; 
Robinson, 1976), and translated into German, and from the Berlin Affective Words List Re-
loaded (Võ et al., 2009), a list of affective German words. 
We slightly modified the collection procedure applied by Barnier et al. (2004), who had 
instructed participants to describe events for each of the presented cue words, and allowed par-
ticipants to choose individually from a broader selection of cue words in order to assure that 
participants were able to describe a sufficient sample of authentic autobiographical events. Par-
ticipants received the neutral, positive, and negative cue word lists and a booklet to write down 
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their autobiographical events and to rate them according to several characteristics (see below). 
For each cue word list, participants were asked to describe a specific event they had personally 
experienced within the last 6 months in response to 16 cue words, and to write down a descrip-
tion of the event in one or two sentences. Participants were told not to describe routines (e.g., 
“Thursdays I usually go swimming”) but specific events. They were instructed to think of non-
emotionally significant events in response to the neutral cue words, and of emotionally positive 
or emotionally negative events in response to the emotionally positive or negative cue words. 
To prevent ceiling effects due to divergent cognitive processing of extremely emotionally 
charged events (e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990; for a review, see 
Christianson & Safer, 1996), for emotionally positive and negative cue words, participants were 
asked to think of medium intense emotionally positive and negative events in their everyday 
life, rather than of profound, drastic events.  
Participants worked successively on all three cue word lists; the order in which the neu-
tral, positive, and negative cue word lists were provided was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Immediately after having written down the description of an event, participants rated the 
event on 7-point-scales according to its clarity (“How clear is your memory of the event?”; 1 = 
not clear at all, 7 = very clear), personal relevance (“How personally relevant/significant is this 
memory for you?”; 1 = not relevant at all, 7 = very relevant), emotional valence (“How positive 
or negative is this memory for you?”; 1 = very negative, 7 = very positive), emotional arousal 
(“How emotionally arousing is this memory for you?”; 1 = not at all emotionally arousing, 7 = 
very emotionally arousing), and the frequency with which they had previously thought of this 
event or told others about it (“How often did you think about this memory or told others about 
it?”; 1 = not at all, 7 = very often). Table 1 shows the characteristics of the collected sample of 
autobiographical events (for a supplemental analysis of ratings of memory characteristics as a 
function of emotion condition and assigned practice condition, see Supplementary Material).  
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Table 1 
Mean Ratings for the Characteristics of the Sample of Autobiographical Memories Retrieved 
by Participants in Response to Neutral, Positive, and Negative Cue Words. 
 Emotional quality of cue word 
 Neutral Positive Negative 
Ratings of memory 
characteristics 
M SD M SD M SD 
Clarity 5.07 0.98 5.98 0.58 5.76 0.48 
Personal relevance 2.51 0.91 4.83 0.88 4.43 0.92 
Emotional valence 4.07 0.25 6.01 0.47 2.25 0.40 
Emotional arousal 2.23 1.02 4.71 0.83 4.80 0.83 
Frequency of previous 
retrieval 
1.99 0.66 3.99 0.91 3.86 0.90 
Note. Participants rated their memories in terms of clarity (1 = not clear at all, 7 = very clear), personal 
relevance (1 = not relevant at all, 7 = very relevant), emotional valence (1 = very negative, 7 = very 
positive), emotional arousal (1 = not at all emotionally arousing, 7 = very emotionally arousing), and 
the frequency with which they had previously thought of this event or told others about it (1 = not at all, 
7 = very often). 
 
Design and Procedure 
Figure 3 depicts the procedure of the experiment. The experiment consisted of four ses-
sions. An initial collection session, a retrieval practice/restudy session the following day, and 
two delayed memory test sessions that took place at different retention intervals (2 weeks and 
13 weeks after the retrieval practice/restudy session). The first three sessions took place in the 
laboratory and the second delayed memory test after 13 weeks was conducted via an online 
survey tool (SoSci Survey; Leiner, 2014) where participants accessed their individualized tests 
with a code.  
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Figure 3. Procedure of the experiment. In an initial collection session, participants described 
48 autobiographical events (16 neutral, 16 positive and 16 negative) in response to cue words. 
In a retrieval practice/restudy session the following day, for half of the collected events, partici-
pants received only the cue words, and they were asked to remember and write down the cor-
responding event (retrieval practice); for the other half of the events, the cue words were 
presented together with the collected descriptions, and they were asked to restudy and copy the 
descriptions (restudy). Overall, participants completed three retrieval practice/restudy cycles. 
In two delayed memory test sessions (2 weeks and 13 weeks after the retrieval practice/restudy 
session), memory for all 48 originally collected autobiographical events were tested (for details, 
see Method section). 
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Collection session. At the beginning of the initial collection session, participants were 
told that they were taking part in an experiment investigating how people remember and cope 
with autobiographical memories of emotional and non-emotional events, and that they would 
be asked to describe personally experienced events in the present session, and work in different 
ways on their memories about these events in the following sessions. They were informed that 
the experimenter would have no access to the booklets containing their event descriptions, but 
that independent research assistants would collect and code their anonymized booklets, thus 
ensuring that none of the collected events would be assignable to any individual person. Partici-
pants were instructed that they would subsequently work on three cue word lists and that, for 
each list, their task consisted in sequentially selecting a total of 16 cue words and describe 
personally experienced events from the last 6 months in response to them. They were told that 
there was a list with neutral, one with emotionally positive, and one with emotionally negative 
cue words, and that each participant would start with another list.  
Participants then received a booklet on which they noted a personal code. Each page of 
the booklet contained a space designated to write down the cue word and a short description of 
the corresponding event in one or two sentences, and a series of 7-point scales designated to 
rate the event according to its clarity, personal significance, valence, emotional arousal, and the 
frequency with which participants had previously thought about the event or told it to others. 
Participants were asked to think of events that they had personally experienced during the last 
6 months, and that had lasted seconds, minutes or even hours, but not several days. They were 
instructed to describe unique, specific events, and not regularly recurring events or personal 
routines (for example, a description of a specific event would be “Last Monday when I went to 
the gym, I met Thomas and had a short conversation about his new apartment with him,” but 
not “I usually go to the gym on Monday”). Finally, they were instructed to think of a new event 
for each selected cue word, thus collecting a total of 16 different autobiographical events for 
each list. For the neutral cue words, participants were asked to think of events that did not have 
any emotional significance to them. For the emotionally positive and negative cue words, they 
were instructed to think of emotionally positive or negative events of medium intensity experi-
enced in their daily life (thus, their daily hassles and daily uplifts), rather than of profound, 
intensely emotional events (as for example marriage or death of a significant other). To ensure 
that event descriptions would not largely vary in detail and length across events and partici-
pants, following previous research using the cue word method for the collection of auto-
biographical memories (Barnier et al., 2004, 2007), participants were instructed to write down 
a relatively brief description of one to two sentences for each event.  
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Depending on counterbalancing group, the experimenter first handed the list containing 
the neutral, emotionally positive, or emotionally negative cue words to the participants. There 
were no time restrictions, and the session ended when participants had recalled 16 memories 
for each of the three lists. It took participants between 90 and 120 min to complete the collection 
session. Before leaving the laboratory, participants inserted their completed booklets through a 
slot into a locked box. Afterwards, the booklets were collected by two independent research 
assistants who prepared the individualized booklets for the retrieval practice/restudy session 
and the first delayed memory test session.  
Retrieval practice/restudy session. The retrieval practice/restudy session took place 1 
day after the collection session. At the beginning of the session, participants received via their 
personal code individualized booklets that were prepared before the session. For each partici-
pant, the completed booklet of the collection session was scanned, and the cue words and cor-
responding event descriptions of each page were cut out and stored as image files. The events 
were assigned alternating one by one to the retrieval practice condition or to the restudy condi-
tion, following the order in which they had been described in the collection session; the assign-
ment of the first event was counterbalanced across participants. In this way, for each participant, 
half of the events of each emotional quality were retrieval practiced, and the other half restudied. 
For retrieval practiced events, only the image of the cue word was pasted on a single page; for 
restudied memories, the image of the cue word and the image of the corresponding event de-
scription were pasted on a single page. The order of retrieval practice/restudy was blocked by 
emotional quality, following the same order as in the collection phase. Within each emotional 
quality block, events were presented blocked for retrieval practice or restudy; the order of re-
trieval practice/restudy was counterbalanced across participants. Overall, participants com-
pleted three retrieval practice/restudy cycles, with a short break of 40 s between cycles.  
Participants were instructed that for half of the events they had collected the previous 
day, only the cue word would be presented in the booklet, and that in this case their task would 
be to remember the corresponding event and describe it in the designated space beneath the cue 
word. For the other half of the memories, the cue word would be presented together with the 
corresponding event description, and in this case, their task would be to carefully read the cue 
word and the event description, and to copy the event description in the designated space be-
neath. A time slot of 40 s was allotted for restudying or retrieving one event. When time was 
up, participants were notified by an acoustic signal to turn the page in their booklet and continue 
working on the next event. The total duration of the retrieval practice/restudy session was 
  
49 STUDY 2: Testing Memories of Personally Experienced Events 
around 100 min; at the end of the session, participants again inserted their completed booklets 
into the locked box.  
First delayed memory test session. Two weeks after the retrieval practice/restudy ses-
sion, participants returned to the laboratory for the first delayed memory test session. At the 
beginning of the session, they received their individualized test booklet via their personal code. 
The test booklets contained, for all 48 originally collected autobiographical events, a page 
showing only the corresponding cue word; the order followed the order in which the events had 
been described in the collection session. Participants were instructed to remember the auto-
biographical event they had described in response to the cue word in the first session of the 
experiment, and to write a description of the events in the designated space beneath the cue 
word. For each event, a time slot of 40 s was allotted, after which a signal tone notified partici-
pants to turn the page of the booklet and try to remember the next event. After finishing the test, 
participants answered a questionnaire unrelated to the study question. Then, they inserted their 
completed test booklets into the locked box.  
Second delayed memory test session. Thirteen weeks after the retrieval practice/ 
restudy session, participants received an email with a link to the second delayed memory test 
that was performed within an online survey environment (SoSci Survey; Leiner, 2014). Partici-
pants could access their individualized memory test via their personal code. The cue words 
participants had originally selected in the collection phase were presented one by one on a single 
page each, following the order in which the events had been described in the collection session. 
Participants were prompted to remember the autobiographical event they had described in re-
sponse to the cue word in the first session of the experiment and type it in the designated space 
beneath the cue word; they were asked to write “no memory” if they could not recall the cor-
responding event. There was no time restriction; however, to ensure that participants would 
really try to recover their memories rather than only click through the test, they had to stay at 
the same page for at least 15 s until a button appeared through which they could progress to the 
next cue word. The whole test had to be completed within one session that took participants on 
average 27 min. After the memory test, participants answered a questionnaire unrelated to the 
study question.  
Twenty-nine participants undertook the memory test on the same day that they had re-
ceived the invitation email or on the following day, 18 participants undertook the memory test 
within 1 week after receiving the invitation email, and one participant did not take part in the 
delayed memory test. Thus, the participants’ individual retention intervals between retrieval 
practice/restudy and the second delayed memory test lay between 13 and maximal 14 weeks. 
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Scoring 
Memories were scored as correctly remembered if the event description at recall corre-
sponded to the event description given for the corresponding cue word in the collection session. 
Following the scoring procedure applied by Barnier et al. (2004, 2007) exact correspondences 
were not required, but there had to be a clear relation between the descriptions of the events 
described for the same cue word at recall and in the collection session, that is, they had to 
contain at least some of the same information and unambiguously refer to the same event. For 
instance, if the original description was “my boyfriend and I were drinking wine in front of the 
Eiffel tower,” then “wine under Eiffel tower” was scored as correctly, but “trip to Paris” not, 
because the latter description does not unambiguously refer to the same event. Similarly, if the 
original description was “a few weeks ago I went running and discovered a nice little park,” 
then “I discovered a nice park” was scored as correctly, but “a sunny day and going for a walk” 
not, because the latter description does not clearly relate to the original description.  
Two raters independently scored all recall protocols of the retrieval practice and delayed 
memory test sessions. Cohen’s Kappa (κ) was performed to determine consistency among raters 
and indicated high inter-rater reliability, κ = .94 (p < .001), 95% CI [0.93, 0.95]. Finally, any 
discrepancies between raters were solved by a third rater.  
Results 
Memory performance in the retrieval practice/restudy session (cycle 1, cycle 2, cycle 3) 
and in the delayed memory tests (2 weeks, 13 weeks) as a function of the type of previous 
practice (retrieval practice, restudy) is shown in Figure 4 (for mean recall rates among emotion 
conditions, see Supplementary Material, Table 3).  
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Figure 4. Percentage of correct recall of autobiographical events in the retrieval practice/ 
restudy session (cycle 1, cycle 2, and cycle 3) and in the delayed memory test sessions 
(2 weeks, 13 weeks) as a function of the type of previous practice (retrieval practice, restudy). 
Error bars represent standard errors of the means.  
 
Retrieval practice. For the retrieval practice/restudy session, a 3 (Retrieval Practice 
Cycle: cycle 1, cycle 2, cycle 3) × 3 (Emotion: neutral, positive, negative) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was performed on the recall rates obtained in the three consecutive retrieval practice 
cycles. The analysis showed a significant main effect of Retrieval Practice Cycle, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected F(1.39, 65.51) = 28.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .375, but no significant Retrieval Prac-
tice Cycle by Emotion interaction, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F(3.05, 143.36) = 0.96, p = 
.413, ηp
2 = .020, indicating that correct recall rates, independently of emotion condition, in-
creased throughout the three successive cycles. Pairwise comparisons, collapsed over emotion 
conditions, showed a significant increase in memory performance from the first (MCycle 1 = .83, 
SD = .11) to the second retrieval practice cycle (MCycle 2 = .87, SD = .10), F(1,47) = 29.89, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .389, and a less substantial, but significant increase from the second to the third re-
trieval practice cycle (MCycle 3 = .88, SD = .10), F(1,47) = 4.74, p = .035, ηp
2 = .092. There was 
  
52 STUDY 2: Testing Memories of Personally Experienced Events 
also a significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 94) = 3.80, p = .026, ηp
2 = .075. Pairwise com-
parisons, collapsed over retrieval practice cycles, revealed that this main effect was driven by a 
significant difference between recall rates for neutral (MNeutral = .89, SD = .13) and positive 
memories (MPositive = .83, SD = .15), F(1,47) = 7.13, p = .010, ηp
2 = .132. There were no signifi-
cant differences between recall rates for negative (MNegative = .86, SD = .13) and neutral mem-
ories, F(1,47) = 2.60, p = .114, ηp
2 = .052, nor between recall rates for negative and positive 
memories, F(1,47) = 1.45, p = .235, ηp
2 = .030.  
Delayed memory tests. One participant dropped out before the second delayed memory 
test session. Therefore, all analyses of correct recall rates in the delayed memory tests are based 
on the remaining sample of 47 participants (45 females, MAge = 21.3, SD = 5.6). A 2 (Retention 
Interval: 2 weeks, 13 weeks) × 2 (Type of Practice: retrieval practice, restudy) × 3 (Emotion: 
neutral, positive, negative) repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Re-
tention Interval, F(1, 46) = 118.53, p < .001, ηp
2 = .720, indicating a significant decrease in cor-
rect recall rates after a retention interval of 13 weeks compared to a retention interval of 2 weeks 
(M2 weeks = .82, SD = .12 vs. M13 weeks = .68, SD = .15, collapsed over emotion and practice con-
ditions). There was no main effect of Emotion, F(2, 92) = 2.60, p = .080, ηp
2 = .054, nor a sig-
nificant Emotion by Retention Interval interaction, F(2, 92) = 2.41, p = .095, ηp
2 = .050, indi-
cating that correct recall rates did not significantly differ for neutral, positive and negative 
memories. The analysis showed no significant main effect for Type of Practice, F(1, 46) = 2.53, 
p = .118, ηp
2 = .052, nor a significant Type of Practice by Retention Interval interaction, F(1, 
46) = 0.02, p = .904, ηp
2 < .001. Hence, recall rates for repeatedly retrieved memories did not 
significantly differ from recall rates for repeatedly restudied memories, neither after a retention 
interval of 2 weeks (MRetrieval Practice = .82, SD = .14 vs. MRestudy = .80, SD = .15, collapsed over 
emotion conditions), nor after a retention interval of 13 weeks (MRetrieval Practice = .69, SD = .16 
vs. MRestudy = .66, SD = .17, collapsed over emotion conditions) (see Fig. 4). There was also no 
significant Type of Practice by Emotion interaction, F(2, 92) = 0.85, p = .431, ηp
2 = .018, nor a 
significant three-way interaction between Retention Interval, Type of Practice and Emotion, 
F(2, 92) = 2.49, p = .089, ηp
2 = .051. 
Discussion 
The present research addressed the question whether the testing effect, that is, the find-
ing that active retrieval from memory benefits long-term retention more than repeatedly 
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restudying, extends to autobiographical memory. For this purpose, participants repeatedly re-
trieved or repeatedly restudied personally experienced autobiographical events that they had 
experienced within the last 6 months. In a delayed memory test 2 weeks after the retrieval prac-
tice/restudy session, no significant difference emerged between recall rates for previously re-
peatedly retrieved and previously repeatedly restudied autobiographical events. Importantly, 
this pattern persisted even after a long retention interval of about three months; while overall 
recall performance significantly decreased from the medium to the long retention interval, this 
decline was not any different for previously retrieved than for previously restudied events, thus 
ruling out the possibility that the benefit of retrieval practice in autobiographical memory might 
only emerge after comparably long retention intervals (Kornell et al., 2011). Thus, it seems that 
the typical testing effect commonly found for non-personal information does not extend to auto-
biographical memory representations of personally experienced events. 
There are several possible explanations for this finding. Autobiographical memory is 
typically conceived as highly associatively organized (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). This unique characteristics of autobiographical memory representations may at 
the one hand entail a comparably stronger benefit of simple re-exposure in the form of restudy-
ing, as it is well documented in previous research that memory performance is increased for 
highly associatively organized information (for a review, see Bower, 1970). On the other hand, 
the memory boost received from retrieval practice is often explained by the enhancement and 
formation of new associative links between memory traces following successful retrieval (e.g., 
Carpenter, 2011), and may thus be less pronounced for autobiographical information which is 
inherently organized in a highly associative network. Both mechanisms, either on their own or 
in conjunction, can account for the present finding that repeatedly retrieving memories for auto-
biographical events does not benefit long-term retention for those memories any more than 
repeatedly restudying them. Indeed, similar theoretical assertions have been made for the find-
ing that the testing effect is less pronounced or disappears when inherently relationally orga-
nized learning material is employed (Van Gog & Sweller, 2015). Furthermore, it may also be 
that the decreased effectiveness of testing compared to restudying in autobiographical memory 
is attributable to other characteristics of autobiographical memories such as, for instance, high 
self-relevance (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Memory performance for 
self-relevant information is typically increased (for a meta-analysis, see Symons & Johnson, 
1997), and high self-relevance may lead to an enhanced associative processing during restudy-
ing due to increased interest in the restudied contents (for a review, see, e.g., Schiefele, 2001). 
Indeed, an interesting avenue for future research would be to determine the specific mechanisms 
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underlying the decreased testing effect in autobiographical memory by comparing, for instance, 
the effect of testing on memories for autobiographical and matched non-autobiographical 
events.  
The present findings are also relevant for the literature on autobiographic memory re-
hearsal. In previous literature, rehearsal of personal events in social communication and various 
types of private autobiographical memory rehearsal have been distinguished (e.g., Walker et 
al., 2009). However, since typically rehearsal types have been examined that involve retrieving 
personally experienced events from memory, less is known about the relative significance of 
retrieving autobiographical events compared to simple re-exposure to those events. From an 
applied perspective, the latter may occur when listening to rehearsals of socially shared person-
ally experienced events in conversations, but also individually, for example through re-expo-
sure to autobiographical events stored via different media (e.g., diaries, videos, social media 
postings; see Wang, Lee, & Hou, 2017). In line with previous results demonstrating that re-
trieval by talking about socially shared personally experienced events benefits long-term reten-
tion similarly to re-exposure by listening to the rehearsal of those events (Stone et al., 2013), 
the present results show that repeatedly retrieving autobiographical events does not benefit 
long-term retention significantly more than repeated re-exposure to those events. This indicates 
that the pattern reported for memory rehearsal in social contexts may also extend to forms of 
individual rehearsal of and re-exposure to autobiographical events.  
It is important to note that the autobiographical memory paradigm (Barnier et al., 2004) 
that was adapted in the present study to examine post-encoding effects in autobiographical 
memory involves retrieval components in the initial collection phase: Individual autobiograph-
ical memories are collected in response to cue words. In fact, alternative ways of collecting 
autobiographical memories that do not involve initial retrieval by participants (e.g., recording 
the daily life of participants) seem hardly feasible for both economical and ethical reasons. 
Thus, the autobiographical memories in the restudy condition had been at least one time re-
trieved before memory was measured in the 2-week delayed memory test. However, this does 
not necessarily reflect a problem since it seems to be a natural characteristic of autobiographical 
memories that they are retrieved from time to time, as also shown in the present study by the 
ratings of frequency of previous retrieval of the collected autobiographical memories (mean of 
3.3 on a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very often). In fact, it may be that previous 
retrieval is one of the reasons why testing may be less effective than restudying in auto-
biographical memory compared to other types of memories.  
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One potential caveat regarding the interpretation of the memory results in the 13-week 
delayed memory test may be that memory performance may have been influenced by the fact 
that both tested and restudied memories had already been tested once in the 2-week delayed 
memory test. More precisely, according to distribution-based explanations of the testing effect 
(Halamish & Bjork, 2011; Kornell et al., 2011), it may be that actually existing differences in 
memory strength between tested and restudied autobiographical memories are not detectable at 
a retention interval of 2 weeks because the memory strengths of both types of memories are 
still above retrieval thresholds, but only after longer retention intervals. As both tested and 
restudied memories were tested in the 2-week delayed memory test, both may have received a 
(comparable) additional boost in memory strength so that actually existing differences were 
still not detectable at the time of the 13-week delayed memory test. However, such a possibility 
would presuppose relatively slow forgetting rates due to the relatively long delay of the final 
test (13 weeks), which seems unlikely given that a comparatively strong memory decay was 
observed in the present study between the 2-week delayed and the 13-week delayed memory 
tests. Still, it is important to note that future research should examine potential effects of mod-
erating variables such as the number or the spacing of retrieval practice in order to investigate 
the generalizability of the present findings. Thus, from a broader perspective, the present re-
search represents an important starting point for future research on the effects of testing on 
long-term retention of autobiographical memories.  
The fact that we did not observe any difference between a testing and a restudy condition 
indicates that the testing effect (in the sense of a comparison between testing and restudy) seems 
not to occur in autobiographical memory. Still, it may be an interesting question for future 
research to compare the effects of re-exposure (testing or restudy) to a no-treatment control 
condition in autobiographical memory. Furthermore, future research is also necessary to evalu-
ate whether the present findings generalize beyond specific circumstances of the present ex-
periment. First, as the present sample consisted mainly of female undergraduate students, future 
research should investigate the generalizability of the findings across gender and age groups. 
Second, as the second delayed memory test took place in an online setting, future research 
should examine, whether similar long-term effects are found when testing in a laboratory set-
ting.  
The present study also contributes to another line of research addressing the effects of 
repeated testing. In the retrieval practice/restudy session, the amount of correctly recalled auto-
biographical events significantly increased throughout the three retrieval cycles, a phenomenon 
commonly referred to as “hypermnesia,” that is, the improvement of memory performance 
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across varying retention intervals (for a review, see Erdelyi, 2010; Payne, 1987). Concerning 
autobiographical memories, previous research has demonstrated hypermnesia to occur across 
various retellings of one autobiographical event (Bluck, Levine, & Laulhere, 1999). The recall 
pattern observed across retrieval cycles in the retrieval practice/restudy session of the current 
study indicates that the hypermnesic effect also extends to autobiographical memories of mul-
tiple events retrieved in response to external cues. This observation is in line with previous 
interpretations of hypermnesia emphasizing the role of imagery encoded study material (e.g., 
Erdelyi, 2010), as autobiographical memories have been demonstrated to be highly imagery 
(Brewer, 1992).  
Interestingly, in the present study, emotional memories were not better remembered 
than neutral memories. By contrast, in the retrieval practice phase, neutral memories were even 
significantly better recalled than positive memories. At first glance, this seems to be at odds 
with the common finding that memory is enhanced for emotionally significant compared to 
neutral events (for a review, see Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). However, previous studies have 
shown that the emotional enhancement effect disappears when controlling for memory-en-
hancing cognitive factors such as the distinctiveness or relatedness of the stimuli ( Schmidt & 
Saari, 2007; Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007). Talmi et al. (2007) offer two possible 
explanations for these findings. First, because emotional stimuli are usually inherently more 
distinct, related, or attention grabbing than neutral stimuli, the typically observed emotional 
enhancement effect might at least be partially mediated by these cognitive factors. Alterna-
tively, the manipulation of these factors may have simply raised memory performance for neu-
tral stimuli to the same level as for emotional stimuli, regardless of possibly different underlying 
processes for emotional and neutral stimuli. Thus, in the current study, the collected neutral 
autobiographical events may have exhibited features that made them somehow cognitively dis-
tinct, especially as most autobiographical memories are typically emotionally significant 
(Brewer, 1988). More precisely, as participants were specifically instructed to think of neutral 
autobiographical events, they may have selected events that stood out compared to other neutral 
events (e.g., events that involved the breaking of a routine or low-frequent events; Brewer, 
1988), which in turn may have led to equal memory performance for neutral and emotionally 
significant memories. Additionally, in the present study, we focused on moderately emotionally 
intense autobiographical events. As many explanations of the emotional enhancement effect 
emphasize the central role of emotional arousal (for a review, see McGaugh, 2004), it may also 
be that the events collected in the present study were not emotionally arousing enough for the 
emotional enhancement effect to emerge, especially if neutral events also exhibited distinct, 
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memory-supporting features. Thus, concerning the effect of retrieval practice on autobiograph-
ical memories, it may well be that the pattern of results would differ for intensely emotionally 
arousing autobiographical events, an interesting question that should be addressed in future 
research.  
Conclusion 
Retrieving events from memory in a test has been demonstrated to provide a powerful 
boost for long-term retention of those events, even compared to repeatedly restudying the event. 
While the benefits received from testing have been shown across a variety of stimuli material 
and recall tasks, one important memory system has not been addressed in previous research: 
autobiographical memory. In the present study, the testing-effect paradigm was extended to 
autobiographical memories of personally experienced events. Across two delayed memory tests 
with retention intervals of up to three months, no significant memory benefit emerged for pre-
viously repeatedly retrieved compared to previously repeatedly restudied autobiographical 
events. Thus, it seems that the testing effect does not persist in autobiographical memory.  
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Supplementary Data: Further Analysis of Memory Characteristic Ratings 
Results. Table 2 shows participants’ mean ratings for the characteristics (clarity, per-
sonal relevance, emotional valence, emotional arousal and frequency of previous retrieval) of 
the autobiographical memories they described in response to neutral, negative or positive cue 
words as a function of the assigned practice condition (retrieval practice, restudy). 
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Table 2 
Participants’ Mean Ratings for the Characteristics of the Autobiographical Memories De-
scribed in Response to Neutral, Positive, and Negative Cue Words as a Function of Assigned 
Practice Condition (Retrieval Practice, Restudy). 
  Emotional quality of cue word 
  Neutral Positive Negative 
Ratings of memory 
characteristics 
Practice 
condition 
M SD M SD M SD 
Clarity 
Retrieval 
practice 
5.05 1.09 5.98 0.60 5.72 0.55 
Restudy 5.08 0.98 5.97 0.69 5.79 0.54 
Personal relevance 
Retrieval 
practice 
2.50 1.00 4.82 0.97 4.46 0.87 
Restudy 2.51 0.90 4.85 0.91 4.40 1.10 
Emotional valence 
Retrieval 
practice 
4.07 0.30 6.00 0.53 2.25 0.43 
Restudy 4.08 0.28 6.02 0.48 2.24 0.50 
Emotional arousal 
Retrieval 
practice 
2.24 1.08 4.71 0.91 4.80 0.81 
Restudy 2.21 1.01 4.71 0.86 4.81 0.96 
Frequency of previous 
retrieval 
Retrieval 
practice 
1.98 0.73 3.96 1.04 3.80 0.99 
Restudy 2.01 0.67 4.02 0.90 3.93 0.97 
Note. Participants rated their memories in terms of clarity (1 = not clear at all, 7 = very clear), personal 
relevance (1 = not relevant at all, 7 = very relevant), emotional valence (1 = very negative, 7 = very 
positive), emotional arousal (1 = not at all emotionally arousing, 7 = very emotionally arousing), and 
the frequency with which they had previously thought of this event or told others about it (1 = not at all, 
7 = very often). 
 
For each memory characteristic, a 3 (Emotion: neutral, positive, negative) × 2 (Type of 
Practice: retrieval practice, restudy) ANOVA was computed on participants’ ratings. 
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Clarity. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Emotion, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected F(1.48, 69.68) = 44.99, p < .001, ηp
2 = .489, but no significant main effect for Type of 
Practice, F(1, 47) = 0.36, p = .553, ηp
2 = .008, nor a significant Emotion by Type of Practice 
interaction, F(2, 94) = 0.21, p = .814, ηp
2 = .004, indicating that ratings of memory clarity were 
higher for emotional than for neutral memories, and that memories assigned to the retrieval 
practice condition and memories assigned to the restudy condition did not differ in terms of 
memory clarity. 
Personal relevance. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Emotion, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F(1.75, 82.39) = 180.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = .794, but no significant 
main effect for Type of Practice, F(1, 47) = 0.02, p = .879, ηp
2 < .001, nor a significant Emotion 
by Type of Practice interaction, F(2, 94) = 0.28, p = .755, ηp
2 = .006, indicating that ratings of 
personal relevance were higher for emotional than for neutral memories, and that memories 
assigned to the retrieval practice condition and memories assigned to the restudy condition did 
not differ in terms of personal relevance.  
Emotional valence. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Emotion, Green-
house-Geisser corrected F(1.46, 68.50) = 1192.207, p < .001, ηp
2 = .962, but no significant main 
effect for Type of Practice, F(1, 47) = 0.01, p = .916, ηp
2 < .001, nor a significant Emotion by 
Type of Practice interaction, F(2, 94) = 0.05, p = .950, ηp
2 = .001. Thus, the analysis  indicated 
that memories described in response to negative cue words were indeed rated as more negative, 
F(1, 47) = 935.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = .952, and memories described in response to positive cue 
words as more positive, F(1, 47) = 788.30, p < .001, ηp
2 = .944, than memories described in re-
sponse to neutral cue words, and that memories assigned to the retrieval practice condition and 
memories assigned to the restudy condition did not differ in terms of emotional valence. 
Emotional arousal. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Emotion, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F(1.66, 78.09) = 206.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = .815, but no significant 
main effect for Type of Practice, F(1, 47) = 0.01, p = .907, ηp
2 < .001, nor a significant Emotion 
by Type of Practice interaction, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F(1.77, 83.14) = 0.06, p = .925, 
ηp
2 = .001, indicating that ratings of emotional arousal were higher for emotional than for neutral 
memories, and that memories assigned to the retrieval practice condition and memories as-
signed to the restudy condition did not differ in terms of emotional arousal. 
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Frequency of previous retrieval. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
Emotion, F(2, 94) = 144.72, p < .001, ηp
2 = .755, but no significant main effect for Type of Prac-
tice, F(1, 47) = 1.71, p = .198, ηp
2 < .035, nor a significant Emotion by Type of Practice inter-
action, F(2, 94) = 0.32, p = .730, ηp
2 = .007, indicating that participants rated the frequency with 
which they had previously thought of this event or told others about it as higher for emotional 
than for neutral memories, and that memories assigned to the retrieval practice condition and 
memories assigned to the restudy condition did not differ in terms of the frequency of previous 
retrieval.  
Discussion. For all rated memory characteristics, significant differences emerged 
between ratings for the characteristics of memories described in response to emotional cue 
words and ratings for memories described in response to neutral cue words. The ratings of 
emotional valence indicated that emotional valence differed between emotional conditions as 
intended, with memories described in response to negative cue words rated as more negative, 
and memories described in response to positive cue words rated as more positive than memories 
described in response to neutral cue words. Additionally, memories described in response to 
both positive and negative cue words were rated as more emotionally arousing than memories 
described in response to neutral cue words. Regarding further memory characteristics, mem-
ories collected in the negative and positive conditions were also rated as slightly clearer, as 
more personally significant and more frequently previously retrieved than memories collected 
in the neutral condition, thus replicating the pattern for emotional and non-emotional memories 
found in previous studies (Barnier et al., 2004, 2007; Walker et al., 2009). Importantly however, 
memories assigned to the retrieval practice condition and memories assigned to the restudy 
condition did not differ in any of the rated memory characteristics. 
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Supplementary Tables 
Table 3 
Mean Recall Rates for Autobiographical Events During Retrieval Practice (Cycle 1, Cycle 2, 
Cycle 3) as a Function of Emotion Condition (Neutral, Positive, Negative) and Mean Recall 
Rates for Autobiographical Events in the Delayed Memory Tests (2 Weeks, 13 Weeks) as a 
Function of Emotion Condition (Neutral, Positive, Negative) and the Type of Previous Practice 
(Retrieval Practice, Restudy). 
 Emotion condition 
Neutral Positive Negative 
M SD M SD M SD 
Retrieval 
practice 
Cycle 1 .87 .15 .79 .17 .83 .14 
Cycle 2 .90 .13 .84 .15 .86 .14 
Cycle 3 .90 .13 .85 .14 .88 .12 
Delayed   
memory 
tests 
 
2 Weeks 
Retrieval 
practice 
.86 .18 .81 .17 .82 .17 
Restudy .80 .18 .80 .19 .81 .17 
 
13 Weeks 
Retrieval 
practice 
.73 .20 .67 .23 .68 .22 
Restudy .70 .21 .68 .21 .61 .22 
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Table 4 
Neutral, Positive and Negative Cue Word Lists Used in the Experiment (Original German Cue 
Words, English Translations in Brackets). 
Cue word lists 
Neutral Positive Negative 
ausleihen        
(to borrow/to 
lend) 
ordnen           
(to arrange/to 
organize) 
Erfolg   
(success) 
herzlich 
(cordial)  
Streit    
(quarrel) 
peinlich 
(embarrassing)  
Mensa 
(canteen) 
Frage 
(question) 
beschwingt 
(elated) 
Sport     
(sports) 
Abschied 
(farewell) 
krank         
(sick) 
Uhr          
(clock/watch) 
Jacke     
(jacket) 
sonnig    
(sunny) 
Freundschaft 
(friendship) 
Zeitnot 
(shortage of 
time) 
fürchten     
(fear)  
Fenster 
(window) 
Termin 
(appointment) 
helfen             
(to help) 
lecker 
(delicious)  
frieren            
(to be cold)  
tragisch   
(tragic) 
anmelden      
(to register)  
Boden      
(floor) 
Feier 
(celebration/ 
party) 
Natur    
(nature) 
nervös 
(nervous)  
versagen         
(to fail)  
Haushalt 
(housekeeping) 
drucken         
(to print) 
Glück 
(happiness/ 
luck) 
tanzen            
(to dance) 
einsam    
(lonely)  
Lüge             
(lie) 
Schere 
(scissors) 
Frisur 
(hairstyle) 
Ausflug 
(excursion) 
gesellig 
(convivial)  
unfair     
(unfair)  
Pech 
(misfortune) 
aufladen        
(to charge) 
Tisch       
(table) 
spielen            
(to play) 
Tier       
(animal) 
Ärger      
(anger) 
Übelkeit 
(nausea) 
Stift             
(pen) 
gehen            
(to walk) 
entspannt 
(relaxed) 
lachen             
(to laugh) 
verirren          
(to get lost)  
gemein    
(mean) 
Schuh       
(shoe) 
egal 
(indifferent) 
Kompliment 
(compliment) 
kreativ 
(creative) 
Fehler 
(mistake) 
verpassen       
(to miss [e.g. 
the train]) 
öffnen             
(to open) 
Werkzeug 
(tool) 
unterhaltsam 
(entertaining) 
Belohnung 
(reward) 
verlieren         
(to loose) 
anekeln           
(to disgust) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
einkaufen       
(to buy/to shop) 
aufheben       
(to pick up) 
Geschenk 
(present) 
energiegeladen 
(energetic) 
traurig         
(sad) 
Panne   
(mishap/ 
breakdown) 
Lesesaal 
(reading room) 
Brief       
(letter) 
Familie    
(family) 
umarmen       
(to embrace) 
Absage 
(rejection) 
entsetzt 
(appalled) 
E-Mail           
(e-mail) 
mitgeben       
(to give to take 
with them) 
freuen             
(to rejoice) 
Reiseerlebnis 
(travel 
experience) 
Gestank 
(stench) 
allergisch 
(allergic) 
Lampe      
(lamp) 
Wohnung 
(apartment) 
begeistert 
(enthusiastic) 
verliebt 
(enamored) 
Problem 
(problem) 
Vorwurf 
(reproach) 
klingeln         
(to ring/to ring 
the bell) 
fahren            
(to drive/to go 
[by vehicle]) 
Musik        
(music) 
Gespräch 
(conversation) 
verletzen       
(to injure)  
machtlos 
(powerless) 
Tasche       
(bag) 
Eimer     
(bucket) 
Kind        
(child) 
warm       
(warm) 
Sorge      
(worry) 
schlaflos 
(sleepless) 
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Abstract 
Based on studies demonstrating that testing promotes better long-term retention than 
restudying (i.e., the testing effect), testing has been recommended as a powerful tool to boost 
knowledge acquisition in educational settings. However, a factor ubiquitous in real-life learning 
contexts has been ignored to date: the learner’s affective state. To examine whether the learner’s 
affective state influences the testing effect, we conducted two experiments. We employed a 
standard testing-effect paradigm consisting of an initial study phase and a subsequent restudy/ 
testing phase, and induced negative, neutral, or positive affective states either before partici-
pants initially studied short expository texts (Experiment 1) or before they restudied or were 
tested on them (Experiment 2). After 1 week, memory for the texts was tested. In both experi-
ments, previously tested material was better remembered than previously restudied material. 
However, in none of the experiments did the memory advantage of testing over restudying vary 
as a function of affect condition. Hence, the present results suggest that testing seems to benefit 
long-term retention independently of the learner’s affective state.  
  
  
65 STUDY 3: Tests Improve Memory – No Matter if You Feel Good or Bad While Taking Them 
Based on numerous studies demonstrating that being tested on studied material pro-
motes better long-term retention than restudying the material (i.e., the testing effect, Carrier 
& Pashler, 1992), more frequent testing has been recommended as a powerful technique to 
boost long-term knowledge acquisition in educational settings (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006a; Roediger & Pyc, 2012). Indeed, the benefit of testing over restudying has been replicated 
for a large variety of materials, across various test formats (see Rowland, 2014, for a meta-
analysis), and has been extended from laboratory studies to field studies in the classroom (e.g., 
McDaniel et al., 2007).  
However, the potential influence of various psychological factors that are ubiquitous in 
real-life educational settings is largely unknown. For instance, recent studies have shown that 
factors such as trait test anxiety (Tse & Pu, 2012), performance pressure (Hinze & Rapp, 2014) 
and extrinsic motivation (Kuhbandner et al., 2016) can reduce the benefit received from testing. 
Another factor that seems to be especially relevant in real-life educational settings is the 
affective state learners experience when taking a test (e.g., Pekrun et al., 2002).  
There is a large body of research showing that positive and negative affect promote 
different cognitive processing styles (for a review, see Clore & Huntsinger, 2007, 2009; Fiedler 
& Hütter, 2014), which may have consequences for the effects of testing as well. Negative af-
fect has been demonstrated to promote a predominantly item-specific processing style and posi-
tive affect a predominantly relational processing style. Item-specific processing refers to the 
processing of an event’s distinctive attributes and relational processing to the processing of 
associations between events in relation to other concepts in memory (e.g., Hunt & McDaniel, 
1993). For instance, positive affect has been shown to increase and negative affect to decrease 
the breadth of attention (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002; Rowe et al., 2007; Vanlessen et al., 2016), 
the storage of visual information as integrated object versus independent feature representations 
(Spachtholz et al., 2016; Spachtholz & Kuhbandner, 2017), and the activation of associative 
networks in memory (e.g., Bäuml & Kuhbandner, 2009; Huntsinger et al., 2009; Storbeck, 
2013).  
By promoting different processing styles, affect may influence the benefit received from 
testing as well. In search of a given target information during testing, related concepts in 
memory are activated and thus may serve to update and strengthen the reactivated memory trace 
by establishing additional relations (e.g., Carpenter, 2009, 2011; Kornell et al., 2015; Pyc 
& Rawson, 2010). Negative affect, by promoting an item-specific processing style, may attenu-
ate the spreading of activation in the associative network, which in turn may reduce the benefit 
received from successful retrieval. Positive affect, by promoting a relational processing style, 
  
66 STUDY 3: Tests Improve Memory – No Matter if You Feel Good or Bad While Taking Them 
may enhance the activation of associations and thus increase the benefit received from success-
ful retrieval.  
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the effect of testing on long-
term memory may differ depending on the learner’s affective state during testing. For this pur-
pose, we planned to conduct two experiments. As in real-life learning settings affective states 
are typically already present during studying (Pekrun et al., 2002), and theories on mood-de-
pendent memory suggest that humans encode their affective experience together with the 
learned material and reactivate it when retrieving the material (e.g., Bower, 1981), in Experi-
ment 1, affective states were induced at the beginning of the whole learning process. In Experi-
ment 2, affective states were induced specifically during the restudy/testing phase.  
We employed the testing-effect paradigm introduced by Roediger and Karpicke (2006b) 
where participants initially study short scientific texts, followed by a restudy/testing phase 
where participants either restudy the texts or are tested on them. Affective states were manipu-
lated either before participants started to study the texts (Experiment 1), or before they started 
to restudy the texts or were tested on them (Experiment 2). In both experiments, after 1 week, 
memory for all texts was tested (for an illustration, see Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5. Procedure of the experiments. Both experiments consisted of an initial study phase, a 
subsequent restudy/testing phase where participants restudied one of the previously studied 
texts and were tested on the other text, and a delayed memory test on both texts after 1 week. 
Depending on affect condition, negative, positive, or neutral affect was induced before partici-
pants started to initially study the texts (Experiment 1) or specifically before they started to 
restudy or were tested on them (Experiment 2).  
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We expected to replicate the typical pattern of the testing effect for the neutral affect 
conditions, that is, superior recall in the delayed memory test for initially tested compared to 
initially restudied texts. However, our main interest was to investigate whether the pattern of 
the testing effect would change in the negative or positive affect conditions, relative to the neu-
tral affect conditions. We assumed that negative affect may decrease, and positive affect may 
increase the benefit received from testing, resulting in the advantage for tested compared to 
restudied material increasing when experiencing positive affect, and decreasing or even disap-
pearing when experiencing negative affect.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. A power analysis revealed that to achieve a power of .90 for detecting 
small to medium sized effects (repeated measures ANOVA, within-between interaction, 
f = 0.20, α = .05, r = .30 between repeated measures1; G*Power 3.1.7; Faul et al., 2007), a sam-
ple size of at least 114 would be required. Thus, we decided to recruit 120 undergraduate stu-
dents (110 females, MAge = 21.50, SD = 3.05)2 who participated for course credit or a small 
monetary reward. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Re-
gensburg, and all participants provided informed written consent.  
Material. Two different texts (“the sun” and “sea otters”) were taken from Roediger 
and Karpicke (2006b) and translated into German. The translated texts were 249 and 267 words 
in length. To induce affective states, neutral, positive or negative film clips were presented. 
Two neutral (“Weather Forecasts”), two positive (“Harry and Sally” and “All about Mary”) and 
two negative (“The Champ” and “Schindler’s List”) film clips were selected from data bases of 
standardized film stimuli serving the induction of affective states (Gross & Levenson, 1995; 
Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010). To measure the success of the affect manipulation, 
the affect grid (Russell et al., 1989) was used, which permits participants to rate their experi-
enced affective state on the dimensions of valence (1 = extremely negative, 9 = extremely posi-
tive) and arousal (1 = low arousal, 9 = high arousal).  
Design and Procedure. We used a 2 × 3 mixed-factorial design with the within-partici-
pants factor of learning condition (restudy, testing) and the between-participants factor of affect 
 
1 Due to the application of different texts, small to medium sized correlations between repeated measures 
were expected (e.g., Kuhbandner & Pekrun, 2013). 
2 One participant did not indicate age and gender. 
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condition (neutral, positive, negative). We applied the testing-effect paradigm introduced by 
Roediger and Karpicke (2006b), involving an initial study phase, a subsequent restudy/testing 
phase, and a delayed memory test phase taking place after 1 week, and induced neutral, positive 
or negative affective states during the initial study phase. Participants were randomly assigned 
to the affect conditions (n = 40 per condition).  
All participants were tested individually in separate cubicles. They received a test book-
let containing the texts and tests, and were informed that they were going to study texts for an 
upcoming memory test in the following week. Instructions, film clips, and the affect grid were 
presented on a computer screen using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, 
PA). In the initial study phase, participants studied the texts for 7 min each. Study order of texts 
was counterbalanced across participants. To induce affective states, depending on condition, 
two neutral, two positive, or two negative film clips were presented; participants watched the 
first film clip and then studied the first text; subsequently they watched the second film clip and 
then studied the second text; presentation order of film clips was held constant for all partici-
pants. To measure the success of the affect manipulation, participants rated the affective state 
they had experienced during study immediately after studying each text on the affect grid. After 
a 5-min break during which participants solved simple arithmetic tasks, the restudy/testing 
phase followed. Participants were tested on one of the texts and restudied the other text for 
7 min each. In case of testing, the title of the respective text was printed at the top of a page of 
the test booklet, and participants were instructed to write down as many text contents as they 
could recall without regard for order or verbal phrasing. In case of restudying, the respective 
text was presented again on a page of the test booklet, and participants were asked to reread the 
entire text as often as possible within the given time slot and memorize the contents as well as 
possible. Following Roediger and Karpicke’s (2006b) procedure, they were asked to record the 
number of times they read the entire text by making marks on a separate sheet. Presentation 
order of learning conditions and assignment of texts to learning conditions were counterbal-
anced across participants. Immediately after working on the respective texts, participants rated 
the affective states they had experienced during restudying and testing using the affect grid. 
Between testing and restudying, participants solved simple arithmetic tasks for 2 min. 
At the end of the session, participants indicated in their test booklets if they had read the 
same texts before the experiment. They were then thanked and asked to return to the laboratory 
1 week later. In the delayed memory test phase after 1 week, participants’ memory for both 
texts was tested. Participants received test booklets which contained separate pages with the 
titles of the texts, and they were asked to write down as many contents of the corresponding 
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text as they could recall, without regard for order or verbal phrasing. Each memory test lasted 
7 min. The order of the initially restudied and tested texts was counterbalanced across partici-
pants.  
Results 
Three participants indicated that they had already known the studied texts before the 
experiment and were excluded from data analysis (all from the neutral affect condition). All 
analyses were performed based on the remaining sample of 117 undergraduates (107 females, 
MAge = 21.53, SD = 3.08). Including these participants did not change the significance of any 
of the reported results. 
Affect manipulation check. The effect of the affect manipulation was determined for 
the initial study phase and the subsequent restudy/testing phase. For the initial study phase, 
participants’ ratings of their affect experienced during initial studying were averaged across 
studied texts; for the restudy/testing phase, participants’ ratings of their affect experienced dur-
ing restudying and testing were averaged. 
Regarding valence, in the initial study phase, the ratings were more negative in the nega-
tive condition (M = 4.15, SD = 1.28) compared to the neutral (M = 5.11, SD = 1.44) and posi-
tive conditions (M = 5.70, SD = 1.33), t(75) = −3.10, p = .003, d = 0.72, and t(78) = −5.32, 
p < .001, d = 1.20; the difference between the neutral and positive conditions was non-signifi-
cant, t(75) = −1.88, p = .065, d = 0.43. However, a 3 (Affect Condition: neutral, positive, nega-
tive) × 2 (Time of Affect Rating: initial study phase, restudy/testing phase) ANOVA revealed 
a significant Affect Condition × Time of Affect Rating interaction, F(2, 114) = 24.59, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .301, indicating that the affective state induced at the beginning of the learning process was 
not similarly stable across affect conditions. Whereas valence ratings did stay relatively stable 
in the neutral (M = 4.81, SD = 1.27; t(36) = 1.65, p = .108, gav = 0.21) and positive (M = 5.38, 
SD = 1.15; t(39) = 2.13, p = .039, gav  = 0.26) conditions, valence ratings did strongly increase 
in the negative condition (M = 5.39, SD = 1.03), t(39) = −5.97, p < .001, gav = 1.04). As a re-
sult, in the restudy/testing phase, valence ratings were more positive in the positive compared 
to the neutral conditions, t(75) = 2.04, p = .045, d = 0.47, and also more positive in the negative 
compared to the neutral conditions, t(75) = 2.19, p = .032, d = 0.51, with valence ratings not 
differing between the positive and negative conditions, t(78) = 0.51, p = .959, d = 0.01.  
Regarding arousal, in the initial study phase, the ratings were higher in the positive (M = 
6.03, SD = 1.66) compared to the neutral (M = 4.92, SD = 1.83) and negative (M = 5.09, SD = 
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1.64) affect conditions, t(75) = 2.78, p = .007, d = 0.64, and t(78) = 2.54, p = .013, d = 0.58; the 
difference between the neutral and negative conditions was not significant, t(75) = −0.43, p = 
.671, d = 0.10. A 3 (Affect Condition: neutral, positive, negative) × 2 (Time of Affect Rating: 
initial study phase, restudy/testing phase) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Affect 
Condition, F(2, 114) = 3.38, p = .037, ηp
2 = .056, but neither a main effect of Time of Affect 
Rating, F(1, 114) = 0.52, p = .433, ηp
2 = .005, nor a significant Affect Condition × Time of 
Affect Rating interaction, F(2, 114) = 1.81, p = .169, ηp
2 = .031, indicating that arousal did not 
change from the initial study phase to the subsequent restudy/testing phase (MNeutral = 4.99, 
SD = 1.97; MPositive = 5.58, SD = 1.41; MNegative = 5.16, SD = 1.55).  
Scoring. To assure consistent scoring of recall responses, each single piece of infor-
mation was considered as one idea unit, resulting in detailed scoring schemes of 42 idea units 
(“the sun”) and 51 idea units (“sea otters”).3 Recall responses were scored by giving one point 
for each correctly recalled idea unit. Initially, one third of the recall protocols were scored sep-
arately by two independent raters. Cohen's Kappa (κ) was performed to determine consistency 
among raters, and given the high inter-rater reliability, κ = .81 (p < .001), 95% CI [0.795, 
0.827], the remaining protocols were scored by only one rater. 
Main analysis. To explore the effects of affective states and learning conditions on 
participants’ recall rates in the memory tests, analyses of variance were performed. In addition, 
the recall data were examined by estimating Bayes factors (e.g., Wagenmakers et al., 2018), 
indicating the likelihood of the observed data under the alternative hypothesis, compared to the 
likelihood of the observed data under the null hypothesis (BF10). For this purpose, the data were 
analyzed with the JASP software (JASP Team, 2018) using the Bayesian ANOVA method-
ology proposed by Rouder, Morey, Speckman, and Province (2012). According to current rules 
of thumb (e.g., Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Wetzels et al., 2011), a BF of 1–3 is considered as anec-
dotal or weak evidence, a BF of 3–30 as substantial to strong evidence, a BF of 30–150 as very 
strong evidence and a BF of > 150 as decisive evidence.  
Immediate memory test. Participants recalled on average 52.7% of the texts. Recall 
rates did not significantly differ between affect conditions (MNeutral = .55, SD = .14 vs. MPositive = 
 
3 Roediger and Karpicke (2006b) divided each text in 30 idea units. However, in their scoring scheme, 
single idea units often include several pieces of information, and they do not report which cut-off criterion 
was used to determine if a given idea unit was scored as correct. Hence, we decided to use a more fine-
grained scoring scheme. In both experiments, all data were analysed on the basis of the scoring scheme 
provided by Roediger and Karpicke as well, and as the pattern of results did not differ, the results of the 
present study are only reported based on the fine-grained coding scheme. 
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.53, SD = .18 vs. MNegative = .50, SD = .15), F(2, 114) = 0.69, p = .506, ηp
2 = .012. The estimated 
BF10 was 0.14, corresponding to a BF01 of 7.03, indicating that the observed data are about 
7 times more likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis.  
Delayed memory test. Figure 6A shows recall performance in the 1-week delayed 
memory test as a function of learning condition (restudy, testing) and affect condition (negative, 
positive, neutral).  
 
 
Figure 6. Results of the experiments. Memory performance in the delayed test after 1 week in 
Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B) is shown as a function of learning condition (restudy, 
testing) and affect condition (neutral, positive, negative). Error bars represent standard errors. 
(C) shows the observed relationship in the combined data set (N = 237) between the emotional 
valence experienced during the restudy/testing phase and overall memory performance in the 
memory test after 1 week, and the individual effect of testing (i.e., difference between recall 
rates for tested and restudied material).  
 
A 2 (Learning Condition: restudy, testing) × 3 (Affect Condition: neutral, positive, nega-
tive) ANOVA was conducted on the recall rates in the delayed memory test. The analysis re-
vealed a significant main effect of Learning Condition (MTesting = .39, SD = .15 vs. MRestudy 
= .31, SD = .16, collapsed over affect conditions), F(1, 114) = 34.51, p < .001, ηp
2 = .232, but no 
significant main effect of Affect Condition, (MNeutral = .37, SD = .10 vs. MPositive = .34, SD = .15 
vs. MNegative = .34, SD = .15, collapsed over learning conditions), F(2, 114) = 0.60, p = .549, 
ηp
2 = .010, nor a significant Learning Condition by Affect Condition interaction, F(2, 
114) = 0.06, p = .944, ηp
2 = .001. The Bayesian analysis provides, compared to the null model, 
decisive evidence supporting the model containing the effect of Learning Condition 
(BF10 = 292,775), but substantial evidence against the model containing the effect of Affect 
Condition (BF10 = 0.19, corresponding to BF01 = 5.28 in support of the null model). 
Furthermore, a comparison of the model containing solely the two main effects with the model 
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adding the Learning Condition by Affective Condition interaction (see Wagenmakers et al., 
2018) indicates that the observed data are about 12 times less likely under the model including 
the interaction (BF = 64,974/5,428 = 11.97).  
Conditional probabilities. Finally, we examined the impact of affective states on mem-
ories that were initially successfully retrieved; that is, we determined the conditional probabil-
ities of recall in the delayed memory test given successful recall in the immediate test. Condi-
tional probabilities did not significantly differ between affect conditions (MNeutral = .65, SD = 
.13 vs. MPositive = .59, SD = .21 vs. MNegative = .61, SD = .21), F(2, 114) = 1.20, p = .305, ηp
2 = 
.021. The estimated BF10 was 0.22, corresponding to a BF01 of 4.63, indicating that the observed 
data are about 5 times more likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative 
hypothesis. 
Discussion 
Basically, the results of Experiment 1 replicate the typical testing effect: a free recall 
test on initially studied text material led to superior recall performance in a 1-week delayed 
memory test in comparison to restudying the same material. More importantly, the effects of 
testing did not vary as a function of affect condition. Independent of affect condition, the same 
advantage of testing over restudying was found, and the same benefit was observed for initially 
successfully retrieved material. Additionally, Bayesian analyses provide substantial to strong 
evidence in support of the null hypothesis assuming no effect of affective states on the 
advantage of testing over restudying, and on the benefit received from initial successful 
retrieval. However, the results of the affect manipulation check revealed that participants in the 
positive affect condition rated their affect experienced during initial studying only marginally, 
statistically non-significant, more positive than participants in the neutral affect condition, and 
that the affect induced at the beginning of the learning process was not similarly stable across 
affect conditions. Consistent with theories on mood-dependent memory (e.g., Bower, 1981), 
participants in the positive affect condition rated their affective state still more positive in the 
restudy/testing phase compared to participants in the neutral condition. However, in the nega-
tive affect condition, the participants’ affective state substantially changed. Although partici-
pants in the negative affect condition rated their affective state more negative than participants 
in the neutral and positive affect conditions in the initial study phase, in the subsequent restudy/ 
testing phase, they rated their affective state more positive than participants in the neutral affect 
condition, and equally positive than participants in the positive affect condition. Indeed, such a 
finding is well in line with mood repair theories, which suggest that the experience of negative 
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affect activates mechanisms by which the unpleasant feelings are overcome (e.g., Morris 
& Reilly, 1987). However, as the affective state of participants in the negative affect condition 
was no longer negative in the restudy/testing phase, it remains to be shown whether the testing 
effect is indeed robust against the experience of negative affect during testing.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. The required sample size was determined by the same power analysis as 
in Experiment 1. We recruited 120 undergraduate students (105 females, MAge = 21.97, SD = 
3.52) who participated for course credit or a small monetary reward. The study was approved 
by the Ethics Committee of the University of Regensburg, and all participants provided in-
formed written consent. 
Material. The same texts and film clips as in Experiment 1 were used again. 
Design and procedure. The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, with 
the only exception that neutral, positive and negative affective states were induced specifically 
in the restudy/testing phase. Depending on affect condition, two neutral, two positive or two 
negative film clips were presented. Participants watched the first film clip and then restudied 
or took a test on the first text; subsequently, they watched the second film clip and then restudied 
or took a test on the second text; the order of the restudy and testing conditions was counterbal-
anced across participants. To measure the success of the affect manipulation, participants rated 
the affective state they had experienced during restudying and testing immediately after work-
ing on the respective texts.  
Results  
Affect manipulation check. To determine the success of the affect manipulation, par-
ticipants’ ratings of their affect experienced during restudying and testing were averaged. 
Valence ratings were more negative in the negative condition (M = 4.71, SD = 1.38) compared 
to the neutral (M = 5.44, SD = 1.38) and positive (M = 5.93, SD = 1.07) conditions, t(78) = 
−2.35, p = .022, d = 0.53, and t(78) = −4.39, p < .001, d = 0.99; the difference between the 
neutral and positive conditions was non-significant, t(78) = −1.76, p = .082, d = 0.40. Arousal 
ratings did not significantly differ between affect conditions (MNeutral = 5.31, SD = 1.53; 
MPositive = 5.75, SD = 1.35; MNegative = 5.46, SD = 1.59), F(2, 117) = 0.89, p = .414, ηp
2 = .015.  
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Scoring. The same scoring procedure as in Experiment 1 was applied. Again, two inde-
pendent raters scored one third of the recall protocols. Cohen's Kappa (κ) was performed and 
given the high inter-rater reliability, κ = .85 (p < .001), 95% CI [0.832, 0.859], the remaining 
tests were scored by only one rater.  
Main analysis. The same analyses of variance and Bayesian analyses as in Experi-
ment 1 were performed.  
Immediate memory test. Participants recalled on average 57.7% of the texts. Recall 
rates did not significantly differ between affect conditions (MNeutral = .59, SD = .17 vs. MPositive = 
.57, SD = .16 vs. MNegative = .57, SD = .13), F(2, 117) = 0.14, p = .866, ηp
2 = .002. The BF10 was 
0.09, corresponding to a BF01 of 11.21, indicating that the observed data are about 11 times 
more likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis. 
Delayed memory test. Figure 6B shows recall performance in the 1-week delayed 
memory test as a function of learning condition (restudy, testing) and affect condition (negative, 
positive, neutral). 
A 2 (Learning Condition: restudy, testing) × 3 (Affect Condition: negative, positive, 
neutral) ANOVA on the recall rates in the delayed memory test revealed a significant main 
effect of Learning Condition, F(1, 117) = 46.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = .282. Collapsed over affect con-
ditions, initially tested material was remembered better than initially restudied material 
(MTesting = .44, SD = .17 vs. MRestudy = .34, SD = .17), thus replicating the typical pattern of the 
testing effect. However, there was no significant main effect of Affect Condition, (MNeutral = 
.39, SD = .17 vs. MPositive = .39, SD = .15 vs. MNegative = .41, SD = .13, collapsed over learning 
conditions), F(2, 117) = 0.22, p = .800, ηp
2 = .004, and no significant Learning Condition by 
Affect Condition interaction, F(2, 117) = 0.16, p = .855, ηp
2 = .003. The Bayesian analysis 
provides, compared to the null model, decisive evidence supporting the model containing the 
effect of Learning Condition (BF10 = 20,830,000), but substantial evidence against the model 
containing the effect of Affect Condition (BF10 = 0.12, corresponding to a BF01 = 8.25). 
Furthermore, a comparison of the model containing solely the two main effects with the model 
adding the Learning Condition by Affective Condition interaction (see Wagenmakers et al., 
2018) indicates that the observed data are about 13 times less likely under the model including 
the interaction (BF = 3,243,000/253,242 = 12.81).  
Conditional probabilities. Finally, we determined the conditional probabilities of recall 
in the delayed memory test given successful recall in the immediate test. Conditional probabil-
ities did not significantly differ between affect conditions (MNeutral = .63, SD = .21 vs. MPositive = 
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.65, SD = .18 vs. MNegative = .70, SD = .16), F(2, 117) = 1.46, p = .236, ηp
2 = .024. The BF10 was 
0.26, corresponding to a BF01 of 3.79, indicating that the observed data are about 4 times more 
likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis.  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 again replicate the typical testing effect: a free recall test 
on initially studied text material led to better recall performance in a 1-week delayed memory 
test than restudying the material. Crucially, the effects of testing did not vary as a function of 
affect condition. Independent of affect condition, the same advantage of testing over restudying 
was found, and the same benefit was observed for initially successfully retrieved materials. 
Additionally, Bayesian analyses provide substantial to strong evidence in support of the null 
hypothesis assuming no effect of affective states on the advantage of testing over restudying, 
and on the benefits received from initial successful retrieval. However, it is important to note 
that only the negative affect induction, but not the positive affect induction, led to reliable 
differences in participants’ ratings of their affective state experienced during restudying/testing 
compared to the neutral affect condition.  
Combined Data Set 
One caveat for the interpretation of the experiments’ results is that the affect induction 
did sometimes yield only weak to moderate effects on participants’ ratings of their affective 
states experienced during testing and restudying. In Experiment 1, participants to whom nega-
tive affective states were induced during the initial study phase rated their affect experienced in 
the restudy/testing phase in fact as more positive than participants in the neutral affect condi-
tion. In Experiment 2, participants to whom positive affective states were induced directly in 
the restudy/testing phase rated their affect only marginally more positive than participants in 
the neutral affect condition.  
As participants varied in the effects of the affect induction, we supplemented the 
analyses based on the experimental conditions with additional analyses based on participants’ 
individual ratings of their affect experienced during restudying/testing. In this way, we aimed 
to gain further insight into the influence the affect actually experienced during testing may have 
on the benefit received from testing.  
For this purpose, we combined the data set from both experiments (N = 237 participants) 
and conducted simultaneous regression analyses using participants’ affect ratings as predictor 
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variables and participants’ immediate and delayed memory performances, participants’ condi-
tional probabilities of recall in the delayed memory test given successful recall in the immediate 
test and participants’ individual effects of testing as dependent variables. The individual effect 
of testing was defined as the difference between the recall rate for restudied and the recall rate 
for tested material, determined individually for each participant.4 
Results 
Simultaneous regression analyses were conducted using affect ratings as predictor vari-
ables. To analyze possible interactions between valence and arousal ratings, both variables were 
centered on their respective means, and mean-centered valence ratings, mean-centered arousal 
ratings, and their cross product were entered in the basic regression model used in all analyses. 
Regressing immediate memory test performance on this set of predictors revealed a significant 
effect for valence, β = .21, t = 3.00, p = .003, but no significant effect for arousal, β = −.01, t = 
−0.16, p = .875, and no significant interaction, β = −.01, t = −0.17, p = .869. Regressing 
memory performance in the delayed memory test on the same set of predictors also showed a 
significant effect for valence, β = .21, t = 3.07, p = .002, but no significant effect for arousal, 
β = .13, t = 1.91, p = .058, and no significant interaction, β = .10, t = 1.44, p = .152. Hence, the 
analyses demonstrate that valence is a significant independent predictor of memory perfor-
mance in the immediate and delayed memory tests, with recall rates decreasing with higher 
negative affect, and increasing with higher positive affect (see Fig. 6C). 
Next, the individual effect of testing was regressed on the same predictors, revealing 
that none of the variables was a significant predictor (all βs < .05 and > −0.3, all ps > .518), 
which indicates that participants’ affective state during the restudy/testing phase does not influ-
ence the advantage of testing over restudying (see Fig. 6C). Finally, conditional probabilities 
of recall in the delayed memory test given successful recall in the immediate test were regressed 
on the same set of predictors. The analyses revealed significant effects for arousal, β = .20, t = 
2.91, p = .004, but no significant effect for valence, β = .08, t = 1.08, p = .282, and no signifi-
cant interaction, β = .08, t = 1.22, p = .223. Thus, while emotional valence did not influence the 
benefits received from testing for successfully retrieved memories, such benefits did increase 
with increased arousal. 
 
4 In order to control for possible effects of the assignment of texts to learning conditions, all reported re-
gression analyses were performed including type of text assignment as an additional predictor, and as the 
results did not differ, only the results based on the original set of predictors are reported. 
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In addition, Bayesian linear regression analyses were conducted using the JASP soft-
ware (JASP Team, 2018). We report the Bayes factor which indicates how many times more 
likely the data occurs under each model compared to the null model containing no predictor. 
For immediate test performance, the model containing valence as predictor outperformed the 
null model (BF10 = 22.79), but the model containing arousal as predictor (BF10 = 0.21) and the 
model containing the valence*arousal interaction (BF10 = 0.28) did not. For delayed test per-
formance, the model containing valence as predictor outperformed the null model 
(BF10 = 41.27), as did the model containing arousal as predictor (BF10 = 4.39), while the model 
containing the valence*arousal interaction did not (BF10 = 0.14). For the individual effect of 
testing, the null model outperformed all other models (all BF10 < 0.16, all BF01 > 6.22), provid-
ing substantial evidence in favor of the null model. For conditional probabilities of recall in the 
delayed memory test given successful recall in the immediate test, the model containing arousal 
as predictor outperformed the null model (BF10 = 15.62), but the model containing valence as 
predictor (BF10 = 0.58) and the model containing the valence*arousal interaction (BF10 = 0.14) 
did not. Thus, the Bayesian analysis also provides evidence that emotional valence predicts 
immediate and delayed memory performance, but does not influence the individual effect of 
testing, nor the benefits received from testing for successfully retrieved memories. 
Discussion 
Participants’ ratings of their valence experienced during testing did neither predict the 
individual effect of testing nor the probability of recall in the delayed memory test given suc-
cessful recall in the immediate test. Thus, both the results of the experiments and the regression 
analyses of the combined data set indicate that the benefits received from testing seem to be 
independent of the learner’s affective state. However, the regression analyses revealed that par-
ticipants’ individual ratings of their valence experienced during restudying and testing signifi-
cantly predicted their memory performances in the immediate and in the delayed tests (β = .21 
in both analyses), indicating that memory performance increased with higher positive affect 
and decreased with higher negative affect. This pattern of results is well in line with previous 
meta-analyses demonstrating that overall the effects of negative affect on performance are det-
rimental but only small in magnitude (e.g., Hembree, 1988; Seipp, 1991). In addition, Bayesian 
regression analyses also provide strong to very strong evidence in support of the models con-
taining emotional valence as predictor of immediate and delayed memory performance, but 
substantial evidence in favor of the null model containing no predictor of the individual effect 
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of testing. Thus, the results suggest that while affect seems to influence overall memory perfor-
mance, the benefits received from testing may be immune to affective influences, at least in the 
range of the affective intensities examined in the present research. 
Interestingly, the regression analyses, both frequentist and Bayesian, suggest that there 
might be an exception to the latter rule. While emotional valence did neither influence the ad-
vantage of testing over restudying nor the benefits received from successful retrieval, arousal 
predicted the latter one, with benefits increasing with increased arousal.  
General Discussion 
The present research aimed to clarify the potential influence of the learner’s affective 
state on the effects of testing. For this purpose, we induced negative, positive, or neutral af-
fective states before participants started to study short scientific texts (Experiment 1) or before 
they started to restudy or were tested on them (Experiment 2). In both experiments, performance 
in a delayed memory test after 1 week was better for previously tested than for previously 
restudied material, thus replicating the typical testing effect. However, the memory advantage 
of testing over restudying did not vary as a function of affect conditions in any of the experi-
ments.  
Interestingly, a recent study shows similar results than the present study with regard to 
the effects of emotional significance of learning materials on the testing effect (Emmerdinger 
et al., 2018). In that study, participants studied cue-picture pairs consisting of a neutral cue and 
an either emotionally negative or neutral picture, and subsequently restudied the cue-picture 
pairs or retrieved pictures via the associated cue. In a delayed memory test after 1 week, recall 
performance was superior for formerly tested compared to formerly restudied pictures, again 
replicating the testing effect. However, although replicating the typical effects of emotional 
significance on overall memory performance, emotionally negative and neutral pictures did not 
differ in the effects of testing and restudying. Hence, the testing effect seems to be unaffected 
both by the emotional significance of the tested memories themselves, as indicated in the study 
of Emmerdinger et al. (2018), and by the affective state of the learner, as indicated in the present 
research. Taken together, these results suggest that testing effects might be generally relatively 
immune to emotional influences, at least in the range of the examined affective intensities.  
The fact that we did not find any differences in the benefit received from testing between 
affect conditions may seem surprising in view of previous findings showing a wide range of 
effects of affective states on cognitive processing (for a review, see Clore & Huntsinger, 2007, 
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2009). However, in most of these studies, effects of affect have been demonstrated for very 
specific cognitive tasks. By contrast, a complex task such as text learning reflects combined 
effects across all processing stages. Indeed, findings on the impact of affective states on more 
complex cognitive tasks remain discordant about whether affect improves or impedes perfor-
mance (e.g., Jung, Wranke, Hamburger, & Knauff, 2014; Knörzer, Brünken, & Park, 2016). 
Thus, the effect of affective states on the testing effect may be more complex than initially 
assumed. For instance, the predominant processing styles generally found in negative and in 
positive affective states have also been described in terms of two adaptive functions, accom-
modation and assimilation (e.g., Fiedler, 2001). Accommodation refers to the updating of in-
ternal knowledge structures based on incoming information, while assimilation refers to the 
interpretation of the external world on the basis of internal knowledge structures. Thus, detri-
mental effects of negative and beneficial effects of positive affective states on elaborative pro-
cessing may have been counteracted by reverse effects regarding the impact of the reactivated 
memory representation on internal knowledge structures. More precisely, successfully reacti-
vated memory representations may have promoted updates of internal schemes more likely 
when experiencing negative affect, but less likely when experiencing positive affect. Conse-
quently, from a broader perspective, the present research represents an important starting point 
for future research on the effects of affective states on the testing effect and its potentially 
underlying mechanisms.  
The present research also raises several more specific questions that should be addressed 
in future research. First, it is important to note that in the current experiments, only moderate 
intense affective states have been examined. In particular, valence ratings indicated that affect 
experienced during initial studying in Experiment 1, and during restudying/testing in Experi-
ment 2, did not significantly differ between the positive and the neutral affect conditions. Thus, 
a potential caveat when interpreting the present results is that effects may emerge when stronger 
affect intensities are elicited, especially concerning the positive affect inductions. This concern 
is partly alleviated by the fact that regression analyses, both frequentist and Bayesian, at the 
level of participants’ individually experienced affect did not provide any evidence for effects 
of affective intensity: participants’ individual ratings of their valence experienced during 
restudying and testing, while predicting overall memory performance, did neither predict the 
individual effect of testing nor the benefit observed for initially successfully retrieved materials. 
Furthermore, the fact that affect ratings did not always substantially differ between affect 
conditions may also be partly due to their measurement after the respective study tasks, as 
reliable affective changes when using the same affect induction procedures have been reported 
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in studies where affect was measured directly after the induction (e.g., Kuhbandner & Pekrun, 
2013; Kuhbandner, Pekrun, & Maier, 2010). We decided to apply the study and restudy/testing 
phases directly following affect inductions in order to prevent fading of affective intensity be-
fore engaging in the study or testing activities. However, this procedure may also have resulted 
in the affect measurement capturing already faded affect intensities. Still, it cannot be ruled out 
that effects on the advantage of testing compared to restudying might emerge if stronger affect 
intensities are elicited, a question that should be examined in future research.  
Second, while the focus of the present research was on affective states in terms of va-
lence, the results of the regression analyses suggest that, in contrast to valence, arousal may 
indeed influence the benefit received from successful retrieval. In line with the present result 
that arousal predicted the long-term benefit received from successful retrieval, previous re-
search has shown that arousal induced immediately following initial recall enhances later re-
trieval for successfully retrieved memories (Finn et al., 2012; Finn & Roediger, 2011). On the 
one hand, it has been suggested that arousal can modulate memory consolidation (e.g., Cahill 
& McGaugh, 1998; McGaugh, 2000), corroborated by findings that memory enhancements for 
emotionally arousing stimuli often emerge only after comparably long retention intervals (e.g., 
Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 1999; Sharot & Yonelinas, 2008). On the other hand, the bene-
fits of testing may in part rely on retrieval-induced reconsolidation of the memory trace (Finn 
et al., 2012; Finn & Roediger, 2011). Thus, moderate arousal may enhance the benefit received 
from successful retrieval by fostering retrieval-induced reconsolidation processes. Furthermore, 
regarding the effects of arousal, recent studies show that the testing effect is preserved even if 
very strong arousal is experienced during memory retrieval (Smith et al., 2016; Szőllősi et al., 
2017), and that previous retrieval practice may even immunize memories against detrimental 
effects of very high arousal on memory retrieval (Smith et al., 2016). However, these studies 
differ from the present experiments in that the effects of testing in neutral conditions on the 
effects of arousal present at the final test were examined, while in the present study arousal 
during restudy/testing predicted benefits in a later test conducted under neutral conditions. In 
summary, while not the focus of the present research, a further examination of the role of 
arousal for the benefits of testing represents an interesting avenue for future research.  
Conclusion 
Based on the finding that testing improves long-term memory retention compared to 
restudying, more frequent testing in educational settings has been recommended (e.g., Roediger 
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& Pyc, 2012). However, the affective state of the learner, an important factor in real-life edu-
cational settings, has to date been ignored in testing-effect research. In the present study, in two 
experiments, we replicated the typically observed pattern of the testing effect, thus better 
memory performance in a 1-week delayed memory test for previously tested than for previously 
restudied materials. This pattern of results did not change across a neutral, negative and positive 
affect condition. Thus, extending previous research, the present experiments suggest that testing 
seems to benefit long-term retention independently of the learner’s affective state. Future re-
search is needed to corroborate these findings and clarify if effects may be different when 
stronger affect intensities are experienced. 
Funding 
This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) [Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft] under grant number KU 3325/2-1 to Christof Kuhbandner. 
  
82  
 
 
 
PART III 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 
 
  
83 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Summary of Findings 
As reviewed in the first part of this thesis, previous research has shown that testing 
memories for previously studied contents enhances long-term retention more than providing 
additional restudy opportunities, and numerous studies have identified influencing factors and 
boundary conditions for the testing effect (for a meta-analysis, see Rowland, 2014). However, 
despite its relevance for educational implications, one potentially moderating variable has re-
ceived only marginal attention: the influence that emotions may exert on the testing effect. The 
present research aimed to provide a first step towards closing this research gap.  
From a functional perspective, emotions may influence cognitive processing on two 
general levels (Kuhbandner & Pekrun, 2010, p. 37). First, emotionally significant memories 
may be processed qualitatively different than neutral memories. Thus, the first of the three peer-
reviewed studies presented in the second part of this thesis examined whether the effects of 
testing and restudying may differ for emotionally significant learning events compared to neu-
tral ones. In this context, memories of personally experienced events are a special type of emo-
tionally significant memory representations. Autobiographical memory representations exhibit 
unique characteristics (Conway, 2005) that may potentially influence the testing effect. Hence, 
the second study examined the testing effect for emotional and unemotional memories of per-
sonally experienced events. Finally, the affective state of the learner may influence information 
processing, independent of whether the processed information is emotionally significant or neu-
tral. Thus, the third study, across two experiments, pursued the question whether the learners’ 
affective state during studying and testing may modulate the typically observed pattern of the 
testing effect. 
STUDY 1 investigated whether the effects of testing differ for emotionally negative 
stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. Participants studied cue-target pairs consisting of neutral 
retrieval cues and either emotionally negative or neutral target pictures, and were subsequently 
tested on, or restudied the cue-target pairs. For both emotionally negative and neutral target 
pictures, the typical pattern of the testing effect emerged in a 1-week delayed cued recall test. 
Memory performance for previously restudied target pictures exceeded memory performance 
for control target pictures that had not been presented again, but memory performance for pre-
viously tested target pictures was highest. Additionally, equal conditional probabilities of cor-
rect recall in the delayed cued recall test given successful recall in the initial test suggest that 
even the benefit received from successful retrieval did not differ for emotionally negative and 
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neutral targets. Importantly, this pattern emerged albeit a typical emotional enhancement effect 
was also observed. While veridical recall rates in the 1-week delayed cued recall test were about 
the same for emotionally negative and neutral target pictures, more negative than neutral target 
pictures were additionally recalled in a subsequent cue-independent free-recall test, or 
misattributed to another retrieval cue. Thus, although the accessibility via the retrieval cues was 
not enhanced for emotionally negative compared to neutral targets, the availability of the targets 
independently of the cues was enhanced. Taken together, the results of Study 1 indicate that the 
testing effect does not differ for emotionally negative information, compared to neutral infor-
mation.  
STUDY 2 extended the testing-effect paradigm to emotional and unemotional auto-
biographical memories of personally experienced events. Participants initially wrote down brief 
descriptions of personal memories in response to emotionally negative, emotionally positive, 
and neutral cue words. On the following day, participants were tested on half of their previously 
described memories, while the other half of their memory descriptions was presented for 
restudy. In a 2-week delayed cued recall test, recall rates for previously tested autobiographical 
memories did not significantly differ from recall rates for previously restudied autobiographical 
memories, and this pattern of results persisted after a long retention interval of 13 weeks. Im-
portantly, while recall rates significantly dropped from the medium to the long retention inter-
val, the rate of the decline did not differ for previously tested memories compared to previously 
restudied memories, ruling out the possibility that the testing effect may be indirectly mani-
fested as comparably slower time-dependent forgetting (e.g., Abel et al., 2019; Kornell et al., 
2011). Thus, the results indicate that the testing effect may not pertain to autobiographical mem-
ories of personally experienced events.  
Finally, STUDY 3 examined whether learners’ affective states during studying and test-
ing may modulate the testing effect. To address this issue, across two experiments, a testing-
effect paradigm using educationally relevant text materials was employed (Roediger 
& Karpicke, 2006b), and positive, negative, or neutral affect was induced before initially pre-
senting the texts (Experiment 1), or specifically before testing and restudying them (Experiment 
2). In both experiments, in a 1-week delayed free recall memory test, the typical pattern of the 
testing effect emerged, with superior performance for previously tested contents compared to 
previously restudied contents. However, contrary to what was expected, affect did not influence 
the occurrence or magnitude of the testing effect in either experiment. As participants varied in 
the effects of the affect induction, a supplemental analysis based on participants’ individual 
ratings of their affect experienced during restudying and testing was performed on the combined 
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data set of both experiments. The analysis revealed a significant effect of participants’ emo-
tional valence ratings on memory performance that, albeit small (β = .21), was within the ex-
pected range (for a meta-analysis, see Seipp, 1991). However, participants’ valence ratings did 
neither predict the advantage of testing over restudying, nor the benefit received from success-
ful retrieval. Taken together, the results of Study 3 suggest that the testing effect is unaffected 
by mild to medium intense affective states experienced during studying or test taking. 
Emotions as Potentially Influencing Factors on the Testing Effect  
An important endeavor of testing-effect research is to identify influencing factors and 
boundary conditions for the benefits of testing. Emotions have been shown to exert effects on 
all levels of cognitive processing (for reviews, see Clore & Huntsinger, 2009; Fiedler & Hütter, 
2014; Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Kensinger, 2009). Thus, a crucial, but hitherto largely ig-
nored, question is whether emotions may also act as a moderating factor for the effects of test-
ing. Regarding this question, two of the three peer-reviewed studies presented in the main part 
of this thesis suggest that the testing effect may be relatively immune to emotional influences, 
concerning both the emotional significance of tested materials and the affective states present 
during testing of neutral materials. The testing effect emerged when comparing the effects of 
testing for emotionally negative and neutral information (Study 1), and across positive, nega-
tive, and neutral affective states induced before initial studying or before restudying and testing 
(Study 3).  
Study 1 replicated typical emotional memory effects by showing an enhanced availabil-
ity of negative targets in memory, but no enhanced accessibility through retrieval cues, com-
pared to neutral targets. This finding is well in line with previous research demonstrating that 
emotional memory enhancement often comes at the expense of weakened associations to other 
stimuli present in the same scene (for a review, see Kensinger, 2009; Mather, 2007). However, 
testing emotionally negative information did not influence later memory in any other way than 
it did for neutral information: the typical advantage of testing over restudying emerged for both 
emotional and unemotional target pictures. The persistence of the testing effect for emotionally 
negative information may in part be attributable to the fact that an equal proportion of emotion-
ally negative and neutral targets were initially successfully retrieved and thus benefited from 
testing (Kornell et al., 2011). Additionally, equal conditional probabilities of correct final test 
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recall given successful initial recall indicate that, in contrast to the emotional enhancement ef-
fect usually observable at the level of initial encoding, successful retrieval seems not to benefit 
memories for emotional information more than memories for neutral information.  
A potential explanation for this pattern of results may be that, in line with the often- 
observed emotional memory trade-off, successful retrieval may have boosted memory strengths 
for negative targets more than for neutral targets, but associations to the retrieval cue less. As 
both components are decisive for successful retrieval, equal net memory performances may 
have resulted. In accordance with this interpretation, two recent studies found similar results 
when applying initial and delayed memory tests relying on associations (Jia, Gao, Cui, & Guo, 
2018), but modulations of the testing effect for emotionally significant verbal material when 
applying memory tests that predominantly rely on the availability of a given target in memory 
(Jia, Gao, Cui, & Guo, 2019). Furthermore, the present results confirm and extend previous 
findings demonstrating that other factors that modulate memories after initial encoding also 
seem to influence emotionally significant memories in similar ways than neutral memories 
(e.g., Kuhbandner et al., 2009; Sakaki et al., 2014; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). In showing 
that the same seems to apply concerning the effects of testing previously encoded memories, 
the present results extend this research beyond the previously examined memory-impairing 
factors to a memory-enhancing factor. 
Besides the emotional significance of the learning materials per se, the present research 
also indicates that positive and negative affect experienced during studying or during testing 
and restudying does not seem to modulate the testing effect. This finding is especially relevant 
considering potential educational applications, as learners experience a variety of emotions in 
real-life educational environments (Pekrun et al., 2002). In Study 3, across two experiments, 
positive or negative affect induced before initial studying or before testing and restudying did 
not change the pattern of the testing effect, compared to neutral affect conditions. Furthermore, 
supplemental analyses based on participants’ individual affect ratings demonstrated that va-
lence significantly predicted initial and delayed memory performance but did not predict the 
advantage of testing compared to restudying, nor the benefit received from successful retrieval. 
The fact that, contrary to what was expected, the testing effect remained unaffected by the 
learners’ current affective states seems surprising given previous research demonstrating that 
affect modulates current modes of cognitive processing (for a review, see Clore & Huntsinger, 
2007; 2009; Fiedler & Hütter, 2014). However, most of these studies focused on very specific 
cognitive tasks and subprocesses, such as, for instance, visual selective attention (e.g., Rowe et 
al., 2007; for a review see Vanlessen et al., 2016), working memory capacity (Spachtholz, 
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Kuhbandner, & Pekrun, 2014), cognitive priming (Storbeck & Clore, 2008), implicitly 
measured stereotypes (Huntsinger et al., 2009), or intrusion of false memories in list-learning 
procedures (Storbeck, 2013). Indeed, findings concerning affective influences on more complex 
tasks, such as logical reasoning or learning from complex instructional materials are mixed, and 
depend in part on the specific outcome measures (e.g., Jung et al., 2014; Knörzer et al., 2016). 
Performance in the text-learning tasks applied in the present Study 3 reflects the interplay of 
various lower-level and higher-level cognitive subprocesses such as orienting and sustaining 
attention, word recognition, semantic proposition encoding, inferences based on available cog-
nitive schemes, and updating of cognitive schemes (see Wylie et al., 2018). Thus, as discussed 
in more detail in the General Discussion section of Study 3, since the observations at the level 
of the testing effect reflect the net effect of these underlying cognitive subprocesses, the present 
pattern of results may also reflect a combination of divergent emotion effects on the involved 
cognitive processes.  
To date, only a few studies have examined the testing effect in the context of emotions, 
showing, for instance, that retrieval practice under neutral conditions can protect against detri-
mental effects of stress in a delayed memory test (Smith et al., 2016, 2018, 2019) and decrease 
students’ test anxiety in a final exam (Agarwal et al., 2014). Concerning educational implica-
tions of testing-effect research, the present studies complement these studies by showing that 
even if present during initial testing, emotions do not seem to impede the beneficial effects of 
testing. Furthermore, emotional arousal may even boost the benefits received from testing, as 
indicated in the results of the regression analysis in Study 3 (see also Finn & Roediger, 2011; 
Finn et al., 2012). Taken together, these findings seem to imply that testing may indeed be a 
promising technique to boost knowledge-acquisition in educational settings, as its effectiveness 
does not appear to be affected by the experience of emotions or can even be enhanced by it. 
However, on the other hand, the present Study 3 focused on medium intense affective states 
induced by external sources. Thus, the situation may be different for more extreme affect inten-
sities, and when affect is induced by the test situation itself. Both aspects will be discussed in 
more detail further below.  
While Study 1 and Study 3 showed robust testing effects across emotional conditions, 
Study 2 revealed a potential boundary condition: The testing effect did not emerge for auto-
biographical memories of personally experienced events. Previous studies demonstrated 
benefits of retrieval practice of autobiographical memories compared to non-retrieved 
autobiographical memories (e.g., Barnier et al., 2004; García-Bajos & Migueles, 2017; Stone 
et al., 2013). However, there is some evidence that re-exposure to autobiographical memories 
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may benefit later memory similarly than actively retrieving them (Stone et al., 2013), which 
was also the case in the present Study 2. A potential explanation for the present results is that 
restudying may benefit autobiographical memories more than other learning events, as memory 
performance is typically increased for highly associatively organized (Bower, 1970) and self-
relevant materials (for a review, see Symons & Johnson, 1997), which are both inherent char-
acteristics of autobiographical memories (Conway, 2005). On the other hand, because they are 
already inherently organized in a highly associative network, autobiographical memories may 
profit less from the elaborative processes initiated through retrieval. Both mechanisms, alone 
or in conjunction, may explain the lack of an advantage of testing compared to restudying for 
autobiographical memories. In addition, the proposed mechanisms are consistent with findings 
implying that the testing effect may be attenuated for highly associatively organized materials 
(for a review, see Van Gog & Sweller, 2015). 
Limitations and Future Directions  
The present research contributes to the existing testing-effect literature by addressing a 
current research gap that, among others, has important implications for educational applica-
tions: the impact of emotions on the testing effect. The presented findings provide first indica-
tions that the testing effect may remain relatively stable across various emotional influences but 
not persist in autobiographical memory. However, there are some limitations and additional 
questions that should be addressed in future research. In summary, the present research repre-
sents an important starting point for research on the impact of emotions on the testing effect, 
which needs to be corroborated and expanded on in future research. 
Emotional Manipulations 
Regarding the kind of emotional manipulations applied in the present studies, it must be 
kept in mind that in the present research, the focus was on the impact of moderate emotional 
intensities. Thus, it may be that the effects would differ when very strong emotional intensities 
were examined. In particular, in Study 3, no significant differences were observed between the 
positive and neutral affect conditions concerning participants’ ratings of emotional valence ex-
perienced during initial studying (Experiment 1) and during restudying and testing (Experi-
ment 2). As discussed in more detail in the General Discussion section of Study 3, affect ratings 
may in part have reflected already faded affect intensities due to the measurement after the 
respective learning tasks, as reliable affective changes have been induced by the same induction 
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procedures when affect was rated directly after the induction procedure (e.g., Kuhbandner 
& Pekrun, 2013; Kuhbandner et al., 2010), and supplemental regression analyses at the level of 
participants’ individually experienced affect did not deliver any indications that affective inten-
sity may modulate the testing effect either. Still, especially concerning the positive affect in-
ductions, it cannot be excluded that the pattern of the testing effect may be influenced by 
stronger affect intensities – an important caveat to be kept in mind when considering educa-
tional applications.  
Moreover, the regression analyses based on individual affect ratings in Study 3 indi-
cated that, unlike valence, arousal may modulate the testing effect: Arousal was a significant 
predictor of the benefit received from successful retrieval. In particular, this finding fits with 
previous research showing that arousal induced immediately after successful retrieval enhances 
later memory (Finn & Roediger, 2011; Finn et al., 2012). These findings may relate to the cen-
tral role of arousal in memory consolidation. Both animal studies and studies with human sub-
jects show that arousal can modulate the consolidation of memories, presumably because re-
gions within the affect processing system, most notably the amygdala, modulate processes in 
brain regions involved in memory consolidation, such as the hippocampus (e.g., Cahill 
& McGaugh, 1998; McGaugh, 2000). At the same time, when memories are retrieved, they 
enter into a labile state that makes them amenable to changes, initiating subsequent reconsoli-
dation processes (for reviews, see Elsey, Van Ast, & Kindt, 2018; Sara, 2010). These retrieval-
induced reconsolidation processes have been assumed to play an important role in explaining 
the benefits of testing (Finn et al., 2012; Finn & Roediger, 2011), and arousal may enhance 
those processes. Thus, one interesting avenue for further research may be to further disentangle 
the influences of (moderate) arousal on the effects of testing and their underlying processes.  
However, effects may be less beneficial when strong arousal or strong affect intensities 
in general are concerned. Previous research on the effects of highly intense emotions on 
memory has revealed mixed results, showing both beneficial and detrimental effects, but in 
most cases, stress during retrieval seems to impair memory (for a meta-analysis, see Shields, 
Sazma, McCullough, & Yonelinas, 2017). Concerning the testing effect, a few previous studies 
found the typical testing-effect pattern even when the delayed memory test occurred under 
memory-impeding conditions of acute stress (Smith et al., 2016, 2018; Szőllősi et al., 2017), 
and even showed that previous retrieval practice can immunize memories against the detri-
mental effects of stress-induced strong emotional arousal (Smith et al., 2016, 2018, 2019). Still, 
it remains an open question how strongly the intensity of the experienced affect present during 
the initial acquisition phase – either during initial encoding or during restudying and testing – 
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influences the testing effect observed in a delayed memory test. If strong affect during retrieval 
impairs memory performance, the benefit received from testing may be attenuated because of 
reduced initial retrieval success.  
Yet, when comparing the effects of retrieval practice and of restudying, different pat-
terns of results are conceivable based on previous research. In educational settings, strong affect 
may be more likely to occur during testing (e.g., in an exam) than during restudying. When 
comparing the effect of retrieval practice under conditions of performance-related affect with 
the effect of restudying in neutral conditions, Hinze and Rapp (2014) found no testing effect 
and even a reversed testing effect for some question types. However, the situation may be more 
complex when emotions are present during both testing and restudying. On the one hand, 
restudying may be less affected by affect-induced memory impairments, because the whole 
material is presented again. On the other hand, affect-induced memory impairments may be due 
to task-irrelevant and distracting thoughts, which divide attention and deplete cognitive re-
sources available for the task at hand (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). These processes may have an equal or even larger 
effect on the reencoding of memory traces during restudying compared to during testing. Task-
irrelevant thoughts induced by affect may lead to similar conditions than dividing attention 
between concurrent tasks. Divided attention, however, mainly disrupts the encoding process 
and has less impact on the retrieval of information (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Perretta, & 
Tonev, 2000; Naveh-Benjamin, Kilb, & Fisher, 2006), and testing effects have been found both 
under divided attention and under full attention conditions (Buchin & Mulligan, 2017, 2019; 
Zhu, Olechowski, & Habib, 2017). Still, findings on potential divergent effects of divided at-
tention on testing and restudying are mixed, sometimes showing detrimental effects only for 
restudying (Buchin & Mulligan, 2017) and sometimes showing detrimental effects for both 
testing and restudying (Zhu et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, it may make a difference whether the influence of externally induced 
emotions present during testing is investigated, as it was the case in the present Study 3, or the 
influence of emotions triggered by the test situation itself is examined (i.e., test anxiety). Ac-
cordingly, a few studies indicate that test anxiety may decrease the beneficial effects of testing 
on long-term memory (Hinze & Rapp, 2014; Khanna, 2015; Khanna & Cortese, 2016). Finally, 
although dimensional affect models (e.g., Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 1999) posit that 
effects of emotions are driven by changes in the underlying dimensions of valence and arousal, 
categorical affect theories (e.g., Ekman, 1992, 1999; Izard, 2009) suggest that additional mech-
anisms may play an important role, such as different underlying appraisal dimensions or action 
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tendencies associated with discrete emotions (e.g., anxiety, anger, sadness) (for a review, see 
Angie, Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011). In summary, future research is needed to resolve 
the question whether the effects observed in the present studies may or may not be different 
when more emotionally intense memories or more intense affective states are examined, and 
whether the source of the current emotion or other mechanisms specific to discrete emotions 
matter. 
Surprisingly, contrary to previous findings (for a review, see Holland & Kensinger, 
2010), in Study 2, no memory enhancement was encountered for autobiographical memories of 
emotionally significant events compared to unemotional events, and during retrieval practice 
neutral memories were even recalled slightly better than positive memories. Interestingly, slight 
advantages for unemotional compared to emotional autobiographical memories in cued recall 
tests were also found in previous studies using the cue-word methodology for initial memory 
collection (Barnier et al., 2004; 2007). Thus, because participants were explicitly asked to col-
lect memories for neutral events, they may have selected memories that were somewhat cogni-
tively distinct from other neutral events (e.g., low-frequent events or events that involved break-
ing a routine; Brewer, 1988), which may have made them equally memorable than emotional 
memories. As previous research has presumed that the emotional enhancement effect for non-
arousing emotional information may rely on non-emotion-specific mechanisms such as dis-
tinctiveness and relatedness (e.g., Schmidt & Saari, 2007; Talmi et al., 2007) or self-referential 
processing (Holland & Kensinger, 2010), this may especially have been the case here, because 
participants were asked to think of medium intense events (thus, their daily hassles and daily 
uplifts) rather than of profoundly intense emotional experiences. However, as in Study 1 an 
emotional enhancement effect emerged albeit participants rated the employed target pictures 
only slightly more emotionally intense (M = 6.60 on a 9-point scale) than participants in Study 2 
rated their autobiographical memories (M = 4.71 for positive and M = 4.80 for negative 
memories on a 7-point scale), it seems likely that the absence of the emotional enhancement 
effect is mainly attributable to characteristics of the neutral autobiographical memories, which 
made them more memorable. 
Another issue concerning the effects of emotions that should be addressed in future re-
search is whether the testing effect remains equally robust when studying and testing emotion-
ally positive information. Both in the present Study 1 and in another study using verbal learning 
material (Jia et al., 2018), emotionally negative stimuli were employed. There is some reason 
to believe that the pattern of results may be different for emotionally positive information. Be-
yond effects of emotional arousal, the emotional valence of the information may also contribute 
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to the effects of emotional significance on memory. As mentioned in Part I of this thesis, the 
formations of item memory and associations between items seem to rely on different mech-
anisms (e.g., Bisby & Burgess, 2014; Davachi, 2006; Giovanello et al., 2003, 2004; Hannula et 
al., 2015), and conditions that promote item-specific processing do not necessarily coincide 
with conditions promoting relational processing. In particular, postulated differential effects of 
positive and negative emotions on relational versus item-specific processing (for reviews, see 
Clore & Huntsinger, 2007, 2009; Fiedler & Hütter, 2014) would entail the typical emotional 
memory trade-off to be more marked for emotionally negative stimuli. Indeed, previous studies 
showed that focal memory enhancements for central features at the expense of more peripheral 
details seem to be more likely for emotionally negative memories (e.g., Berntsen, 2002; for 
reviews, see Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Kensinger, 2009; Mather, 2007). By contrast, the re-
lational processing style predominant when experiencing positive affect may attenuate the emo-
tional memory trade-off by fostering associative connections. In turn, this may lead to different 
effects when regarding the effects of testing for emotionally positive information – a question 
that should be explored in future research.  
Characteristics of the Employed Tests and Materials  
Future research should also address whether the present results can be generalized 
beyond the specific characteristics of the tests and learning materials employed in the present 
research. Regarding the effects of testing emotionally significant information, different results 
may emerge if integral features of the emotional target itself serve as retrieval cues, instead of 
neutral retrieval cues unrelated to the emotionally significant target as employed in the present 
Study 1. Previous research shows memory enhancements for both central and more peripheral 
details if emotions are tied to the complete episode instead of only to salient visual stimuli 
(Laney, Campbell, Heuer, & Reisberg, 2004), or if the peripheral details constitute an integral 
feature of the emotion-eliciting object, such as color, shape, size (D'Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007b), or spatial location (D'Argembeau 
& Van der Linden, 2004; Mather & Nesmith, 2008). Thus, when integral features of the 
emotional target itself serve as retrieval cues, item memory and memory for associations may 
receive similar boosts in storage strength, which may lead to larger benefits received from 
testing compared to neutral targets. 
Furthermore, results may differ when test formats are used that emphasize the avail-
ability of items in memory. In the present Study 1, a standard cued recall testing-effect para-
digm and a two-stage delayed memory test were employed, aiming to capture both accessibility 
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through the retrieval cues, and availability of the target memories independently of the retrieval 
cues, revealing that the testing effect did not differ for emotionally significant and neutral target 
memories. Similar results were found in another study when testing associations between 
emotional words and background scenes (Jia et al., 2018). However, stronger testing effects 
may emerge for emotionally significant information than for neutral information when employ-
ing test formats that aim to test the availability of a given target in memory, such as recognition 
tests. A recent study employed recognition tests and found that the pattern of the testing effect 
differed for emotionally negative and neutral items (Jia et al., 2019). However, in that study, 
contrary to what could be expected, emotionally negative items profited less from testing than 
neutral items. The authors explained this result with comparably less retrieval effort in the initial 
recognition test, thus less benefit from successful retrieval for the emotionally significant items 
than for the neutral items.  In summary, further research needs to clarify the role of different 
test formats when examining the impact of testing for emotionally significant information.  
Similarly, future research should clarify whether the robustness of the testing effect 
across various affective states, as demonstrated in Study 3, persists across different testing con-
ditions and learning materials. Particularly, the testing effects observed in Study 3 were rela-
tively modest, so further studies are needed to determine whether positive and negative affective 
states may influence the magnitude of the effect if a larger baseline testing effect is obtained. 
The relatively modest testing effects in the present experiments may be in part due to medium 
retrieval success in the initial tests. Thus, future research could extend the introduced paradigm 
for examining the effects of affective states on the testing effect in terms of test conditions or 
materials that are more likely to render high initial retrieval success (such as cued recall tests, 
learning to criterion, or simpler learning materials). Furthermore, as the results of the present 
research may have reflected a combination of divergent affective influences on different aspects 
of cognitive processing, future research needs to disentangle the effects of affective states on 
the testing effect and its potentially underlying cognitive mechanisms.  
Another test-related factor that may have influenced the pattern of results in the present 
research is that in Study 2, autobiographical memories were retrieved at two different retention 
intervals. The idea of repeating the memory test after a comparably long retention interval of 
13 weeks was that, following distribution-based models (Kornell et al., 2011), for memories 
with relatively strong initial memory strengths, the testing effect may only emerge after very 
long retention intervals. However, because memories had already been tested at the 2-week 
delay, one could argue that both previously tested and previously restudied memories have re-
ceived comparable memory boosts so previously restudied memories may still have been above 
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recall threshold even at the long retention interval of 13 weeks. Although the relatively strong 
memory decay between the 2-week delayed and the 13-week delayed memory test speaks 
against this argument, it is still important for further research to determine the effects of 
moderating variables such as the number or spacing of testing and restudying opportunities on 
the testing effect for autobiographical memories. For instance, test delay could be introduced 
as an additional experimental manipulation. However, it should be noted that in the present 
Study 2, a quite time-consuming first collection session (90 to 120 min) was necessary in order 
to collect enough memories to prevent ceiling effects. A within-manipulation of test delay 
would require collecting even more memories which might result in participants’ loss of mo-
tivation or concentration, compromising the quality and reliability of the described events.  
Another interesting avenue for future research is the reinvestigation of the effects of 
testing in autobiographical memory using another methodology for initial memory collection. 
As addressed in the Discussion section of Study 2, collecting autobiographical memories with 
the cue-word methodology is an established method in autobiographical memory research (e.g., 
Barnier et al., 2004, 2007; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 2011; Maccallum et al., 2000; Robinson, 
1976), but it bears the problem that it involves initial retrieval of those memories. On the one 
hand, this may not be problematic as it may in any way be a natural characteristic of auto-
biographical memories to be retrieved from time to time, making a clear distinction between 
tested and exclusively restudied memories impossible. On the other hand, one could addition-
ally speculate that the absent emotional enhancement effect for medium intense emotional auto-
biographical memories may in part be due to the fact that participants were explicitly asked to 
think of a neutral memory. As neutral memories typically come less easy to mind than emo-
tional memories (for a review, see Holland & Kensinger, 2010), more retrieval effort may have 
been involved in collecting the neutral memories, boosting their memory strengths and thus 
making them more retrievable at later memory tests. As mentioned in the previous section, at 
least two other studies (Barnier et al., 2004, 2007) using the cue-word methodology also found 
a slight memory advantage for unemotional autobiographical memories in a delayed cued recall 
test compared to emotional autobiographical memories. As collection methodologies that 
would guarantee the exclusion of any retrieval components (e.g., the recording of participants’ 
daily lives) are hardly feasible, one viable alternative might be to employ diary-methods where 
participants record their activities for a given time, although even this methodology involves 
some retrieval components.  
The present research also has implications for recent debates on whether highly associ-
atively structured learning material may or may not constitute a boundary condition of the 
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testing effect (e.g., Rawson, 2015; Van Gog & Sweller, 2015). As described in the previous 
section and in the Discussion section of Study 2, the finding that the effects of testing and re-
exposure do not differ for autobiographical memories may in part be due to the highly associ-
atively organized nature of this kind of memory representations. However, it may also be ex-
plained by other typical characteristics of autobiographical memories, such as high self-
relevance and personal involvement, as both factors are known to enhance later memory (e.g., 
Muscatell et al., 2010; Symons & Johnson, 1997). In order to disentangle the specific under-
lying mechanisms, future research could, for example, compare the effects of testing for auto-
biographical events and matched non-autobiographical events or examine the effects of testing 
on non-associatively structured materials that have been encoded with reference to oneself (for 
a review, see Symons & Johnson, 1997).  
Conclusion  
The present thesis investigated whether emotional factors may affect the mnemonic 
benefits of testing. Two of the three peer-reviewed studies presented in this thesis indicate that 
the testing effect indeed may be relatively immune to emotional influences, concerning both 
the emotional significance of studied information and the affective state of the learner. In these 
studies, equal advantages of testing compared to restudying, and equal benefits received from 
successful retrieval, emerged for emotionally negative and neutral information (Study 1), and 
across positive, negative, or neutral affective states experienced during studying and testing 
(Study 3). However, the present thesis also indicates a potential boundary condition for the 
testing effect. Independent of the emotional significance of the corresponding memories, across 
two delayed memory tests, no advantage for testing compared to re-exposure emerged for auto-
biographical memories of personally experienced events. As autobiographical memories stand 
out due to various characteristics such as self-relevance or highly associatively organized 
memory structure, future research needs to clarify potentially underlying mechanisms of this 
boundary condition.  
The finding that testing effects may be relatively robust across various emotional influ-
ences seems promising in view of potential educational applications, as in real-life learning 
settings the experience of emotions is ubiquitous (e.g., Pekrun et al., 2002). However, further 
research should corroborate and extend the present findings before drawing more decisive con-
clusions. In particular, the findings should be replicated across various test and material char-
acteristics. Additional emotional factors, such as the role of affect intensity, the role of arousal 
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and valence, and the role of the specific emotional manipulations and sources of affect should 
be investigated. From that perspective, the present research provides a starting point to spark 
further research on emotional influences – an important, but hitherto largely overlooked topic 
in testing-effect research. 
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